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MOOT COURT COMPETION
BENCH MEMORANDUM
SYSOP, USER AND PROGRAMMER LIABILITY:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
COMPUTER GENERATED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

by GARY L. GASSMAN

THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL
NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION IN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
LAW
No. 94-241
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
Dede Domingo, a minor, by
Douglas and Madeline Domingo,
her parents and next friends,

)
)

Respondents,

)

v.

)
)

George Gress,
Petitioner.

I.

)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff, Dede Domingo, is fifteen years old and lives with her legal
parents and guardians, plaintiffs Douglas and Madeline Domingo, in the
city of Melrose in the State of Marshall.
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Defendant, George Gress, lives in the city of Melrose in the State of
Marshall. Mr. Gress owns and operates a photography studio in the City
of Melrose and specializes in photographing child models for department
store and mail-order catalogues. Gress is also a skilled amateur computer programmer who, as a hobby, is the operator or "sysop" of an electronic bulletin board system (BBS) which can be accessed through the
Internet. The Internet is an international electronic network easily
available to the public for linking computers and transmitting
information.
As sysop, Gress has managed the operations of the BBS, checking
the system for security problems and conducting routine maintenance
checks. Also, Gress handles all subscriptions, inquiries and contributions to the BBS. Gress personally contributes material to the BBS as
well.
In February, 1993, Gress was commissioned to photograph children
for summer catalogues. Gress set up the shots, posed the children and
took the pictures. The photographs displayed children in summer
clothes, underwear and beach attire. Plaintiff Dede was one of the children employed by Gress in this project. Plaintiffs signed a release permitting the use of the photographs of Dede in specified catalogues but for
no other purpose.
After the photo sessions, Gress developed the negatives and printed
the pictures, providing copies of the photos to his clients and to the child
models for their individual portfolios. Gress kept copies for his own files.
In May, 1993, Gress finished developing a software program which
he made available on his BBS. The program was an interactive sex program entitled "Kid Stuff." Gress was able to scan the photograph of any
person into his computer database and make that image part of the program. Gress used some of the children's pictures he had taken for his
catalogue work and scanned them into his computer, including a bikini
photo of plaintiff Dede Domingo. Using his computer's graphics capabilities Gress could supply the images with any missing details and then
permit the program user to animate the images and portray them in fictionalized sexual scenarios. The program permits the user to create scenarios that depict fellatio, sodomy, masturbation, cunnilingus and a
variety of other aspects of foreplay and sexual intercourse. The graphics
quality is very good and the animations are life-like.
In his answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, Gress explained the procedure involved in accessing and subscribing to his BBS. The Defendant
stated that when someone using the Internet encounters Gress' BBS he
or she has the option of entering the BBS or bypassing. If he or she
enters the BBS, there are three minutes of free browsing time in which
to learn what features are on the BBS. In order to access "Kid Stuff' the
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user must first fill out a questionnaire which appears on the screen, providing name, age and address information. Gress requires a subscriber
to send him a copy of his or her driver's license or other identification
showing proof of birth date. Access to the sex program also requires the
user to pay an extra monthly fee and Gress assigns a personal identifying number (PIN) to each subscriber who must type in his or her age and
PIN each time access to the program is desired.
In July, 1993, sixteen-year-old Johnny Sawyer, a friend of Dede's,
logged onto his computer and, while browsing the BBS operated by
Gress, learned of the existence of "Kid Stuff." Johnny subscribed to
Gress' BBS by filling out the BBS questionnaire, giving his twenty-two
year old brother's identification information. Johnny also secured a photocopy of his brother's driver's license and mailed that to Gress along
with the subscription fee.
On August 20, 1993, Johnny logged onto "Kid Stuff" for the first
time, entering his PIN and "22" when the program asked the user's age.
After a few seconds the program ran a one minute explanation describing exactly what a user was capable of doing with the program. The instructions did not depict any sexually explicit material nor did they
contain a demonstration of images in sexually explicit scenarios. Then, a
variety of children's images appeared on his monitor screen and Johnny,
as any user, was prompted to select a child's image and to select sexual
acts in which the image would participate. Johnny was shocked to see
that one of the images on the screen was that of his friend, Dede Domingo. He immediately phoned Dede and told her about the use of her
image. He also told her how to access the program on the BBS, supplying Dede with his PIN. Dede has taken computer classes at school and
has been working with computers for four or five years.
Later that day, Dede logged onto her computer and searched for "Kid
Stuff' on the BBS. Once Dede found the sex program she typed in "22"
and Johnny's PIN and was prompted to run the explanation, after which
she was permitted to run the program. Dede saw her own image among
the others and realized it could be manipulated in explicit sexual scenarios with images of adults or other children. Dede immediately informed
her parents.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Gress in the Melrose County Circuit Court. In the complaint the plaintiffs claimed that
Gress' conduct violated Marshall's pornography laws, specifically chapter 45, section III, paragraphs A through D. The applicable statutory
provisions follow:
MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES

OBSCENITY, PORNOGRAPHY, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
CHAPTER 45
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§ III. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY:

A. Child Pornography Defined
1. Any material or performance constitutes child pornography if(a) the work appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) the work depicts or describes fornication, sadomasochistic sexual
acts, masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals,
whether normal or perverted, actual or simulated and involves a person
under the age of eighteen engaged in such acts; and
(c) the work, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.
2. Any person who creates or disseminates child pornography will
be liable for not less than $50,000.00 for each individual offense.
B. A person creates Child Pornography when he or she videotapes, films,
photographs, or otherwise uses, depicts, displays or portrays by means of
any visual medium or reproduction, stage play or live performance, any
child whom he or she knows or reasonably should know to be under the
age of eighteen, actually or by simulation engaged in any act or conduct
defined in I A herein, alone or with other children or adults.
C. A person disseminates child pornography to a minor when he or she
recklessly or knowingly supplies, distributes, displays or exhibits, or by
his or her recklessness causes to be supplied, distributed, displayed or
exhibited, to anyone under the age of eighteen years, any material or
performance described in 9 A herein. For purposes of this section, a person is reckless who fails to take adequate means to prevent the dissemination of pornographic materials described herein to anyone under
eighteen years of age.
D. Civil Action by Parent or Guardian:
(1) A parent or legal guardian of a minor child used in the creation
of child pornography as defined herein may bring a cause of action for
damages on behalf of said child in an amount not less than $50,000.00
for each individual violation of paragraph B of this section.
(2) A parent or legal guardian of a minor child to whom child pornography has been disseminated as defined herein may bring a cause of action for damages on behalf of such minor child in an amount not less
than $50,000.00 for each individual violation of paragraph C of this
section.
The plaintiffs alleged that Gress is personally civilly liable under
Ch.45 MRS, §III, for the creation and dissemination of child pornography, and claimed damages of not less than $50,000.00 for use of their
daughter Dede in the creation of child pornography and not less than
$50,000.00 for the dissemination of material depicting their daughter
Dede.
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In his answer, the defendant admitted the foregoing facts in the
plaintiffs' complaint, alleged additional facts previously stated regarding
the procedures involved in subscribing to and accessing the defendant's
BBS and raised affirmative defenses. First, the defendant asserted that
the Marshall statute is unconstitutional and that his program is protected from censorship by the First Amendment.
Second, Gress maintained that, even if the computer program at issue can be constitutionally proscribed, Gress is not liable as a creator or
disseminator of prohibited material because he did not use Dede herself
to create pornography and it is the user who determines what shall be
depicted; Gress does not personally create or communicate any prohibited material over the BBS.
Finally, the Defendant asserted that he took adequate precautions
to prevent minors from accessing his BBS by requiring proof of age from
subscribers.
On February 10, 1994, the Plaintiffs moved for judgment on the
pleadings. Judge Hanson of the Melrose County Circuit Court, for purposes of the Plaintiffs' motion, accepted as true the facts supplied in the
Defendant's answer and set forth above. Judge Hanson, in granting the
Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, held that, as a matter of
law: 1) The defendant's bulletin board program constituted offensive
material constitutionally proscribed under the Marshall Revised Statutes; and, 2) the defendant is civilly liable for the creation and dissemination of the prohibited pornography. Consequently, Judge Hanson
ruled that the Plaintiffs were entitled to statutory damages of $100,000
and costs.
The Marshall Appellate Court accepted appeal on the plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the trial court granted
plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the appellate court accepted as true all facts set forth in the pleadings and reviewed de novo
the questions of law. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
holdings.
Having found that the Marshall Appellate Court had jurisdiction to
hear the appeals involved, this court granted the defendant's leave to
appeal the appellate court's findings as to both issues.
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ISSUES PRESENTED

WHETHER THE MARSHALL STATUTE, WHICH PROHIBITS THE
CREATION OR DISSEMINATION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT

MATERIAL, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

B.

WHETHER THE DEFENDANT, GEORGE GRESS, CAN BE HELD LIABLE

FOR THE CREATION AND DISSEMINATION OF THE PROHIBITED
MATERIAL.

III. BACKGROUND
A.

INTRODUCTION

The facts which make up the scenario in this case create a unique
situation made possible only by technology. This type of scenario has
never been addressed by a court, and whether analogies from past case
law aid in analysis of the scenario created is questionable. This fictionalized case is so challenging because, unlike precedent involving child pornography, no actual children engaged in sexual conduct to create the
pornography in the present case. Moreover, obscene scenarios in the
present case are actually created by users of the computer program since
the program itself does not display any pornographic scenario; the program only makes it possible for a user to create a sexually explicit
scenario.
B.

INTERNET AND BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS

Computer graphics programs available today permit photographs to
be scanned into computer databases. Current software allows programmers and users to manipulate scanned photographs. In fact, certain
software programs have the capability to allow a user to change details
of scanned photographs and animate the photographs. In such instances
users may also involve the new images in active animations through further manipulation.
"A computer bulletin board system is the computerized equivalent to
a bulletin board one hangs on the wall." E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting
Computer Information Systems and Systems OperatorLiability, 3 ALB.

L.J. Sci. & TECH. 79, 82 (1993). Anyone with knowledge of computers
and $2,500 can start a national bulletin board. "[Tihe bulletin board
user connects his or her personal computer to the 'host' computer," which
runs the software and stores the messages, "usually via telephone line."
Id. at 82. The Internet alone connects over 5,500 bulletin board systems
(BBS's). Elmer-DeWitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, TIME, July 25,
1994, at 51.
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The Internet, a blend of thousands of computer systems, links together people from all over the world. Its original purpose was to provide
access to expensive hardware resources to researchers. It has shown tremendous effectiveness as a means of communication and is now used by
librarians, educators, the business community, government employees
and the general public for a variety of purposes. Users may access the
Internet any time day or night and gain access to books and resources or
communicate with others around the world. It currently reaches perhaps 25 million users, and the number increases every year.
The Internet, which is based in the United States, has connections
with networks in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Nordic
countries, Canada, Japan and Australia. It consists of over 8000 global
networks extending to more than 45 countries, many communications
services and thousands of universities, corporations and government entities. The networks are connected by regular telephone lines, leased
high speed lines, fiber optics, microwave links and satellites. The linked
computers talk to each other by using the same protocol (agreed upon
standards of communication) at the same time. To connect to the Internet, all one needs is a personal computer, communications software to
set up the connection, a modem and a phone line. A modem is the device
by which telephone line connection is accomplished. Modems convert
computer data into audio signals which are received by other computers
over telephone lines. A modem at the receiving computer then converts
the audio signals back to computer data. The data can then be read on
the receiving computer's screen. Elmer-Dewitt, at 54.
C.

OBSCENITY, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE COURT

In 1957, the Supreme Court held that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957). In Roth, the defendant was convicted of violating a federal obscenity statute for mailing an obscene book and some sexually explicit
ffiers. Id. at 480. The Court defined obscenity as "material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests." Id. at 487. The
Court also articulated the first obscenity test which provided for a finding of obscenity if "to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest." Id. at 489. The significant elements of
the Roth test were the required assessment of the work "as a whole" and
the use of the "average person's" point of view in the evaluation of the
work.
Nine years later, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Roth
opinion in its clarification of the definition of obscenity and articulated a
new test in A Book Named John Cleland'sMemoirs of a Woman of Plea-
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sure v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The book in Memoirs, an
erotic novel about a London prostitute, was found obscene by the courts
in Massachusetts. Id. at 419. The Supreme Court held that three factors must be established independently for a finding of obscenity. First,
the dominant theme of the material at issue, taken as a whole, must
appeal to the prurient interest in sex. Id. at 418. Second, the material at
issue must be found patently offensive because it offends contemporary
community standards relating to the representation or description of
sexual matters. Id. Third, the material must be found to be utterly
without redeeming social value. Id. Here, the Court significantly altered the Roth obscenity standard by adding this third element. Id. at
419.
In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the defendant was seized
in his own home for the possession of obscene films in violation of a Georgia statute. Id. at 558. The Court held that states lack the power to
regulate or prohibit the possession of obscenity in the privacy of one's
home, even though obscenity does not constitute constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 568. The Court stated that, the "right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to
our free society." Id. "If the First Amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what fims he may watch." Id. at 565.
"[T]he State may no more prohibit mere possession of [obscenity] on the
ground that it may lead to anti-social conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that it may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits." Id. at 567.
The Supreme Court altered the obscenity test once again in 1973, in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The defendant was convicted
under a California statute for mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material advertising adult books. Id. at 16. The California statute incorporated the Memoirs obscenity test. Id. The Court vacated Miller's
conviction (id. at 37), and provided the following three-prong test for determining whether material constitutes obscenity, discarding the
Memoirs "utterly" requirement:
(a) whether the 'average person applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24-25.
The Court also restricted state regulation to only "hard core" depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct. Id. at 27. The Court provided the
following examples of material considered "hard core:" a) "patently offen-
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sive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated;" and b) "patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id. at 25.
The Court elaborated on the Miller test's third prong in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). The defendant there was arrested for violating
an Illinois statute by selling materials deemed obscene. Id. at 499. The
trial court had instructed the jury to evaluate the materials at issue
through the viewpoint of "ordinary adults in Illinois." Id. at 499. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the third prong of the Miller test
asks whether a "reasonable person would find such value in the material
taken as a whole," rather than finding approval by the majority of people
in a particular community. Id. at 500-01.
Note: In a recent case decided in the United States District Court in
Memphis, Tennessee, the defendants were convicted in Tennessee of
transmitting obscene material through interstate phone lines via a computer bulletin board located in California. One of the defense's major
arguments concerned the applicability of the "contemporary community
standards" element of the first prong of the Miller v. Californiaobscenity
test. Stephen Bates, Senior Fellow at the Annenberg Washington Program stated that "the essential impact [of judging obscenity by local community standards in today's social, political and technological climate] is
that the most puritanical, blue-nosed district in the country could dictate
policy on this issue for the entire nation." Landmark Trial Tests Legality
of Cyberporn, SAN FRANcIsco ExAMINER, Al, July 21, 1994. This problem does not arise in our factual scenario, however, since the parties reside in the same jurisdiction. Furthermore, our case does not involve the
cyberspace question concerning where exactly the prohibited material
was received and the wrong occurred.
In 1982, the Supreme Court addressed the specific issue of child pornography in New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747 (1982). There, the United
States Supreme Court held that any advertising or selling of child pornography receives no First Amendment protection. Id. at 764.
In Ferber the Supreme Court gave five reasons for granting the
states greater leeway with regard to the prohibition of child pornography: 1) states have a compelling interest when it comes to ensuring the
psychological and physical well being of minors, id. at 756-757; 2) the
distribution of material depicting minors engaged in sexual activity furthers the sexual abuse of children, id. at 759; 3) the advertisement and
sale of sexually explicit material involving minors provides an economic
incentive for the continued production of child pornography, id. at 761;
4) any value of child pornography "is exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis," id. at 762; 5) child pornography constitutes the type of material which fails to warrant First Amendment protection. Id. at 763. The
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Court stated that "descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not
otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproductions of live performances, retains [sic]
First Amendment protection." Id. at 765.
Later in a case similar to Stanley, the Supreme Court held that
states could constitutionally prohibit the possession of child pornography
in the privacy of one's home. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
The defendant had been apprehended in his home with pictures of minors masturbating. Id. at 107. Under Ohio's statute, possession of any
material depicting a nude minor was prohibited. Id. at 106-107. The
defendant was convicted and sentenced to six months in jail. Id. at 107.
Ohio argued that banning the possession of child pornography would
help to eliminate its production, id. at 109, rid the state of existing child
pornography, id. at 111, and help to prevent pedophiles from seducing
other children to have sex by showing the children child pornography.
Id. The Supreme Court found the Ohio interests compelling and held the
prohibition constitutional. Id.
To date, the Supreme Court of Georgia is the only court which has
reviewed a state statute "that was unclear as to whether it restricted
child pornography to depictions of real children." Aman v. State, 409
S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1991). The statute involved stated that "[ilt is unlawful
for any person knowingly to possess or control any material which depicts a minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-12-100(b)(8); Aman, 409 S.E.2d at 646. The Georgia court narrowed
the scope of the portion stating "depicts a minor" to "any photographic
representation that was made of a [live child model]... " to avoid unconstitutional overbreadth. Id.
D. THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PORNOGRAPHY COMMISSION REPORT

The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography was established on February 22, 1985 by the Attorney General of the United
States at the specific request of President Reagan, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 1 Att'y Gen. Commission on Pornography,
Final Report 215 (1986). The Commission was asked to examine and
determine how great, and what type, of an impact pornography had on
the United States, and to formulate ways for the Attorney General to
more effectively and constitutionally combat the spread of pornography.
Id. Many issues it addressed are relevant to the case at hand.
The Commission enumerated the significant harm resulting from
the creation of child pornography:
The first problem is that of the permanent record of the sexual practices in which children may be induced to engage. [Id. at 411.] Second,
there is substantial evidence that photographs of children engaged in
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sexual activity are used as tools for further molestation of other children.
[Id.] Third, photographs of children engaged in sexual practices with
adults often constitute an important form of evidence against those
adults in prosecutions for child molestation. [Id. at 412.] Finally, an argument related to the last is unquestioned special harm to the children
involved in both the commercial and the noncommercial distribution of
child pornography. [Id.]
The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography emphasized
that in child pornography a child is sexually abused. Id. at 406. The
characteristic of child pornography distinguishing it from obscenity, as
generally understood, is that real children are photographed while performing some form of sexual conduct, either with other children or
adults. Id. at 405. The Commission stated that clearly, the inevitably
permanent record of sexual activity created by a photograph will harm
the children for years. Id. at 406. But the sexual exploitation which occurs in the making of the photograph inextricably links the issues related to the sexual abuse of children and those related to child
pornography. Id.
The United States government has had a much more difficult time
regulating child pornography than other forms of obscenity since the aim
is to stop the production and distribution of child pornography entirely.
The Commission explained that, as demonstrated by the Ferber decision,
the classification of "child pornography" is both more broad and more
narrow than material classified as "obscenity" under Miller v. California.
Id. at 597. "Broader in that it includes materials which are not 'patently
offensive,' which do not appeal to the 'prurient interest of the average
individual,' and which show children in sexual conduct even as an incidental part of the work (rather than 'taken as a whole')." Id. at 597-98.
The category is more narrow, however, because it excludes written
materials and visual materials which fail to exhibit real children engaged in sexual conduct. Id. at 598.
Thus, the Commission explained that the Federal Child Protection
Act of 1984 is designed to "prohibit employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing any minor to engage in any sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2252 (1985). Id. at 619. Finally, the Commission on Pornography made recommendations concerning legislation to
regulate child pornography: one is to prohibit the use of computer networks for the exchange of child pornography;' another would add unde1. Recommendation number 39 states that Congress should enact legislation to pro-

hibit the exchange of information concerning child pornography or children to be used in
child pornography through computer networks. Att'y Gen. Commission on Pornography,
supra, at 628.
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veloped film to the definition
of "visual depiction" in the federal child
2
pornography statute.
E.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

The threshold issue of the problem is whether computer-generated
scenarios involving images of children engaged in sexual conduct can
constitute child pornography. The petitioners should argue that the
images which evolve from use of the program do not constitute child pornography because no real child ever engaged in actual sexual conduct to
create the scenarios. Therefore, the petitioner should conclude that because the statute covers such depictions it is overbroad and
unconstitutional.
The respondents should argue that the rationale of Ferber and other
cases and studies involving traditional child pornography should be extended to cover computer-generated child pornography. The respondents
should rely on arguments emphasizing the harm which occurs after
images depicting a child are disseminated to others, as well as the effect
such images have on viewers. Furthermore, the respondents should contend that even if the court finds that the images created by the program
do not constitute child pornography, the ultimate product at the very
least constitutes obscenity under Miller, the distribution of which may be
proscribed by the state. Consequently, the respondents may ask the
court to sever the potentially overbroad elements of the statute, narrowly
construing the statute in accordance with constitutional dictates.
The second issue involves the petitioner's liability for the creation
and dissemination of prohibited material. This issue is meant to address
wHo actually executed the creation and dissemination of the material
rather than focusing on whether child pornography or obscenity was created at all. The petitioner should argue that he merely provided the
tools by which a user could create the material. Moreover, the petitioner
should assert that he exercised the necessary precautions to prevent
children from accessing the BBS program.
Conversely, the respondents should argue that the petitioner is directly liable for the creation and dissemination of the material and failed
to take adequate precautions against children accessing the BBS program. Alternatively, the respondents should assert that the petitioner
should be found liable under the theory of vicarious liability.
2. Recommendation number 41 states that Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2255
to define the term "visual depiction" and include undeveloped film in that definition. Att'y
Gen. Commission on Pornography, supra, at 637. In an effort to curb the continued exploitation of children, it is necessary to define the term "visual depictions" to include
images contained on rolls of undeveloped film, video tape and sketches, drawings or paintings of actual persons. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS

A.

WHETHER THE MARSHALL STATUTE, WHICH PROHIBITS THE
CREATION OR DISSEMINATION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT
MATERIAL, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

1. Whether the Computer-GeneratedSexually Explicit Depictions
Constitute Child Pornography
a. Gress' Child PornographyArgument
Because the images of children engaged in sexual acts in "Kid Stuff"
are made without the use of live children Gress will likely argue that
they do not constitute child pornography. The Supreme Court stated in
New York v. Ferber, "descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct,
not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproductions of live performances, retains [sic]
First Amendment protection." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765
(1982). Thus, Gress could argue that First Amendment protection
should attach to computer-generated pornography because no child is exploited when someone creates an image without the use of a real child.
In United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1987), the defendant challenged his conviction under a federal child pornography statute
which required the actual use of a minor who engaged in sexually ex-

plicit conduct. The court, addressing an issue similar to the one in the
present case, acknowledged a difference between the use of actual photographs and drawings or other images which did not rely on the use of
actual subjects. Id. at 1017. However, since the defendant failed to produce evidence that the pictures involved had been doctored or that they
were computer-generated images, the government was not required to
disprove that possibility. Id. at 1020.
Gress may also analogize his program to "pseudo child pornography," which is created through the use of older adolescents or adults portraying children in sexually explicit depictions. Att'y Gen. at 618.
Arguably, this is not child pornography since no children have been exploited in the production of the material. Id. Consequently, "pseudo
child pornography" should be treated as obscenity.
b. The Domingos' Child PornographyArgument
The Domingos will likely assert that computer-generated pornography depicting children is indistinguishable from traditional child pornography and does not warrant constitutional protection. The Domingos
will claim that there is no requirement that a child display any sexual
connotations in his or her gestures or demeanor while being photographed. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987). The
photograph of a fully-clothed child may lead to the liability of the photog-
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rapher, depending on the circumstances in which the child's picture is
used. United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated and
remanded, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 13919 at 69 (June 9, 1994).
The Domingos may contend that this court should define "creation"
expansively and look beyond the child's actions and instead concentrate
on the pornographer's use of the resulting work. The Wiegand court proposed a test to judge child pornography by several factors including
whether the depiction of the child "is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer."3 Moreover, many courts analyze factors
such as the focal point of the visual depiction and whether the depiction
suggests willingness to engage in sexual behavior to determine whether
the visual depiction of a minor constitutes unprotected child
4
pornography.
In the present case, the Domingos will argue that Dede's non-pornographic photograph was manipulated, changed, and used solely to arouse
the lusts of others. Gress created child pornography by using her picture
in this manner. Gress added genitals and placed Dede's image in a setting designed to elicit sexual responses. The fact that Dede did not participate in those actions through a LIVE performance does not weaken the
impact of Gress' conduct. Thus, the Domingos will contend that this
court should find the depictions portrayed in "Kid Stuff" to constitute
child pornography.
Although the Domingos will admit that Dede was not photographed
while performing sexual acts, they may assert that the lack of a pornographic performance by a child does not exonerate a defendant who used
that child as an object to fulfill the desires of other pedophiles. Cross,
928 F.2d 1030. Child pornography statutes, such as Marshall's, seek to
punish the actions of those responsible for using children, in any way, to
produce child pornography. Accordingly, the Domingos will want this
court to focus on a pornographer's intent and the nature of the audience
3. Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1239 (defining lasciviousness as a characteristic of the exhibition which the photographer sets up for an audience, not of the child photographed.);
Nebraska v. Saulsbury, 498 N.W.2d 338, 344 (Neb. 1993) (The sexuality of depictions of
children is often imposed upon them by the attitude of the viewer or photographer, thus the
photographer's motive in taking the pictures should be a factor in the determination of
lasciviousness.).
4. U.S. v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989). The cases outline six factors
considered in the determination of lasciviousness: 1) whether the focal point of the visual
depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area, 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity;
3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5)
whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual
activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response
in the viewer. Id., (quoting U.S. u. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
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when analyzing this child pornography claim, without considering that
Dede was not physically victimized. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030 (affirming conviction where defendant filmed the child with parental permission but
then cropped photos to highlight child's nude torso and further added
photographs of adult female genitalia to the video strip); Missouri v. Foster, 838 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a defendant "created" child pornography by photographing a photograph of a child).
2.

Overbreadth

Overbroad statutes are drawn to prohibit specific activities which do
not warrant constitutional protection, but sweep too broadly and include
constitutionally protected activities within their scope, thus chilling protected expression. Board of Airport Commissioners of L.A. v. Jews for
Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1982). "The overbreadth doctrine serves as a
'constitutional safeguard,' ensuring that laws do not include in their
scope constitutional speech which has been 'immunized from government control.'" Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969). Overbreadth must be "real and substantial in relation to [an] ordinance's
plainly legitimate sweep," to strike the statute on First Amendment
grounds. New York v. Ferber, at 770. To be determined overbroad, a
statute must cover a substantial amount of protected activity. Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-18 (1973). In overbreadth analysis, the
Supreme Court recommends that courts narrowly construe seemingly
overbroad statutes, if possible, to regulate only unprotected speech,
rather than striking statutes down for overbreadth. Ferber, at 768-69.
However, the Supreme "Court's invalidation of overbroad laws reflects
the substantive First Amendment principle that laws regulating expression be the 'least restrictive means' of accomplishing their ends." Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 262
(1994).
a.

Gress' OverbreadthArgument

The United States Supreme Court has been increasingly willing to
reconstruct a statute deemed overbroad rather than eliminating it entirely. L. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw, at § 12-28 p. 1 0 2 7 (2d. ed.
1988). For example, in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., the Supreme
Court reviewed a decision which completely invalidated a Washington
statute which sought to prevent and punish publication of obscene material. 472 U.S. 491 (1985). In reversing the holding of the appellate court,
the Supreme Court stated that "a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case
before it. . . ." Id. at 501. Consequently, the Court severed the prohibi-
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tion of materials which excited normal lust leaving the statute with a
constitutional ban on genuinely obscene matter. Id.
Similarly, in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990), the Supreme
Court stated that while the Ohio statute seemed to prohibit depictions of
nudity that may be constitutionally protected the Ohio Supreme Court
sufficiently construed the statute to survive any overbreadth scrutiny.
Id. On the other hand, the Court facially invalidated an entire municipal
ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of any contributions by charitable
organizations not using at least 75 percent of receipts for charitable purposes in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
U.S. 620 (1980).
Gress could assert that the Marshall statute must be drawn carefully and must justify incidental restrictions on First Amendment behavior by providing a compelling interest in prohibiting the computer
program "Kid Stuff." American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F.
Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd, 475 U.S. 1001, and reh'g denied, 475
U.S. 1132 (1986). He will likely assert that since the program does not
pose a direct threat to a child's physical, emotional or mental well being
the state's interest is minimal. 5 Gress could also assert that the Marshall legislature must choose the least
restrictive means to achieve the
6
goal of controlling specific conduct.
b. Domingos' OverbreadthArgument
The Domingos will likely argue that the Marshall Statute at issue is
not unconstitutionally overbroad. The statute contains language commonly found constitutional in state child pornography statutes as well as
the federal statute dealing with child pornography. United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
5. In Butler v. State, the Supreme Court struck down a statute proscribing material
which had a "deleterious influence upon youth." Butler, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). The state
contended that the statute's breadth was justified by the state's compelling interest in
"shielding juvenile innocence" and the promotion of general welfare. Id. However, the
Court held that the statute was overbroad because it would "reduce the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children," even though the state articulated a compelling interest. Id.
6. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see also, American Booksellers Ass'n,
Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd, 475 U.S. 1001, and reh'g denied,
475 U.S. 1132 (1986). In American Booksellers, the court invalidated an Indianapolis municipal anti-pornography ordinance because the city could not provide a compelling interest
to regulate general pornography which constituted protected speech. Id. at 1329. The city
argued that pornography subjected women to sexual discrimination and thus women
needed special protection. Although the court acknowledged that the protection of women's
civil rights constituted a legitimate state interest, the court explained that women could
protect their own civil rights unlike the children in the Ferber case. Id. at 1333-34.
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granted, 114 S. Ct. 1186 (1994); Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et. seq.
In Ferber the Supreme Court provided that, "[i]t is evident beyond
the need for elaboration that a State's interest 'in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.'" Ferber,458
U.S. at 756. Congress has also indicated that depictions of children in
pornographic material harms the emotional and mental health of the
children. Sen. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 43.
The Domingos could assert that the Marshall statute seeks to protect both the physical and emotional harm to minors and is not substantially overbroad. Children need protection from all types of child
pornography whether it consists of films or photos, or computer-generated images. Unlike the statute in Missouri, the Marshall statute does
not provide that child pornography "shall not include material which is
not the visual reproduction of a live event." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 573.025
(1986). Thus, absent clear statutory intent to the contrary, the Domingos will likely ask this Court not to read a limitation into the Marshall
statute.
In the present case, the harm to Dede was psychological and emotional. Without statutory protection Dede would go through life knowing
that people could access the BBS and see her image depicted in sexually
explicit scenarios. Moreover, Dede or other children could suffer physical
harm by the depiction if a pedophile used it to seduce other children or if
a pedophile approached Dede to mimic the behavior depicted in the
program.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the child pornography
distribution network must be closed if production of material which required the sexual exploitation of children was to be effectively controlled,
and upheld the child pornography statute in New York. Ferber,458 U.S.
at 759. The only practical method of prohibiting child pornography was
to impose penalties on those persons selling, advertising or otherwise
promoting the product. Id. at 760. Moreover, while the statute in Ferber
did not make allowance for literary, artistic, political or scientific works,
the Marshall statute provides for those exceptions. Thus, the Marshall
statute effectively protects children like Dede Domingo by penalizing
those who wish to produce, distribute or possess any sexual depictions of
children without unconstitutionally sweeping protected activity within
its scope.
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WHETHER THE DEFENDANT, GEORGE GRESS, CAN BE HELD LIABLE
FOR THE CREATION AND DISSEMINATION OF THE PROHIBITED

MATERIAL.

1. Gress' Liability Argument
a. Creation
Gress will likely claim that his actions do not fall within the boundaries of proscribed conduct since, as the developer of an interactive computer game, he did not "create" the final images that appeared on the
screen. Gress will argue that, since the material at issue is an "interacfive" video, it is the user, and not Gress, who actually determines who
and what shall be depicted in a sexual situation.
When developing software programs made available to users, programmers provide computers with sets of instructions, in essence telling
the computer what to do and how to perform a given task. John T. Soma,
Computer Technology and the Law 8 (1983 & Supp. 1993). Programming
is devoted to designing the "user interface component," which assembles
codes that perform tasks on a user's display screen at the user's direction. David B. Fonda, The InterdependentNature of Computer Software:
Another Reason Why User Interfaces Should Not Be Protected by Copyright Law, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 737, 739 (1992). Thus, interactive
programs are designed to give users the ability to independently interact
with the program and direct it to perform specific tasks.
Here, the tasks the users directed the program to perform consisted
of the creation of sexually explicit scenarios involving images of children.
Therefore, Gress will assert that if anyone should be found liable for the
creation of prohibited material it should be the individual users of "Kid
Stuff."
b. Dissemination
Gress will first assert that since he did not "create" the proscribed
material he never disseminated the material. In fact, Gress should assert that he only disseminated the program, "Kid Stuff." Moreover,
Gress will assert that even though he disseminated "Kid Stuff" to a minor, liability should not attach because he, exercised adequate means to
prevent the dissemination of the program to minors.
In a number of states, when a defendant is charged with disseminating proscribed material to minors, he is usually offered a defense. New
Jersey, for example, has a three-pronged defense which requires: 1) that
the defendant falsely misrepresented his age as over 18; 2) that the appearance of the person was one that an ordinary, prudent individual
would believe the minor to be over 18; and 3) the sale was made in good
faith relying on the representations of the minor. N.J. Stat. Ann.
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§ 2A:115-1.10 (West 1986). However, the appellate court in New Jersey
determined that the sole fact that a minor appears over 18 will not exculpate a defendant who is charged with disseminating pornography. State
v. Blecker 382 A.2d 400 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1978).
In Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission., 492 U.S. 115, 120-22 (1989), the Supreme Court considered the restriction of access by minors to dial-a-porn services. In Sable,
the Court discussed regulations proposed by the Federal Communications Commission which were validated by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Id. at 122. The regulations included three methods for restricting minors' access to dial-a-porn services, one of which was the use of
personal identification numbers. Id. The process of obtaining a PIN involved a written application to verify the age of the applicant. Id. at 12122. The Appellate Court approved the process stating that it was an effective and feasible way to serve the states' compelling interest in protecting minors.
Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988).
New York's obscenity statute also provides a defense for defendants
charged with distributing prohibited material to minors. Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968). The Ginsberg
Court noted that the statute was revised to provide a defense when a
defendant had "reasonable cause to believe that the minor involved was
seventeen years old or more; or that such minor exhibited to the defendant a draft card, [or] driver's license." Id. at 633, n.1. The Court held
that the term "knowingly" in the statute meant that a defendant must
either have reason to know about the sale of pornographic materials to a
minor or that the defendant made an honest mistake about the minor's
age, if a bona fide attempt was made to ascertain his age. Id. at 643-44.
Additionally, a recent FCC regulation provides a defense to "dial-aporn" services charged under the Communications Act for the dissemination of indecent telephone messages to minors. The regulation sets up a
procedure to prevent minors from accessing the services which will operate as an honest mistake or good faith attempt defense if followed. 47
C.F.R. § 64.201 (1993). The procedure requires services to accept payment by credit card before message transmission or by issuing a PIN
through the mail after receiving a written application stating that the
applicant is at least eighteen. Id. The regulation also provides that services should have a procedure to cancel the PIN if it is lost or stolen. Id.
Gress could argue that in order to access "Kid Stuff' the user must
first fill out a questionnaire which appears on the screen, providing
name, age and address information. Next, he requires a subscriber to
send him a copy of his or her driver's license or other identification showing proof of birth date. Access to the sex program also requires the user
to pay an extra monthly fee and Gress assigns a personal identifying
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number (PIN) to each subscriber who must type in his or her age and
PIN each time access to the program is desired.
Gress' precautions are analogous to the precautions taken in Sable.
Moreover, the FCC has indicated that access codes or PINs are a sufficient means of restricting access of dial-a-porn messages to minors.
Therefore, Gress will likely insist that he exercised adequate precautions
under the statute and that even though minors gained access, he can
claim a reasonable defense.
2.

The Domingos' LiabilityArgument

a. Creation
The Marshall child pornography statute holds a person liable if he or
she "creates" child pornography. The statute provides that a person "creates" child pornography when he or she "depicts, displays or portrays by
means of any visual medium or reproduction... any child... actually or
by simulation engaged in any conduct defined in pargraph A herein...."
Thus, the Domingos may assert that, since Gress created the program
which allowed a user to display child pornography, Gress is the creator of
the child pornography. United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 U.S. 594 (1991).
Courts have made clear that the interaction of an end-user with a
video-game does not transform the end-user into the "creator." Steam
Elec. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). In Steam, the appellant,
a game user, claimed that each play of a video game transformed the
existing game into a new original work simply due to the player's participation in the game. Stearn, 669 F.2d at 856. The court rejected this
argument stating that:
[Tihe argument overlooks the sequence of the creative process. Someone first conceived what the audio-visual display would look and sound
like. Originality occurred at that point. Then the program was written.
Finally, the program was imprinted into the memory devices so that, in
operation with the components of the game, the sights and sounds could
be seen and heard.
Id. at 856-857. Therefore, the court concluded that authorship vested in
the original writer of the program because the game's memory devices
determined the game's appearance and movement while the variations
in movement occurred only in response to the player's operation. Id. at
854.
Moreover, in Williams Elec., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l., Inc., 685 F.2d 870
(3d Cir. 1982), the plaintiff, a computer program developer, claimed he
was the creator of the entire video game, even though the game changed
depending on the user-interface. Id. The defendant, argued that each
player became a co-author of that which appeared on the screen as a

1995]

BENCH OPINION

result of video-game play. Id. at 874. The court rejected the defendant's
argument and explained that although action varied according to player
participation, a significant portion of the game was already developed
and remained constant from player to player. Id.
The Domingos may emphasize that Gress created the program from
which the options flow to the user. They could contend that pornography
was created through Gress' manipulation of Dede's photograph. Gress
had already provided a limited number of visual depictions of children
and the acts they may perform, and detailed them within the confines of
the program. The Domingos should stress that a user cannot now add
any new image or action to the screen, thus it should be of little significance that the user controls the path the program takes while he or she
plays. It was Gress who created every tool which allows a user to view
child pornography; exactly the conduct Marshall seeks to punish.
b. Dissemination
Since Gress placed the program on an Internet BBS for others to
access, including minors, the Domingos could argue that Gress disseminated the child pornography. State v. Blecker, 382 A.2d 400 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1978). Also, the Domingos will likely claim that Gress is
liable for disseminating pornographic material to minors because he
failed to take adequate precautions to ensure that minors did not receive
the material. The Internet is used by many pedophiles to disseminate
and exchange child pornography, thus regulated the dissemination of
certain material to minors is critical. Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography,at 326. States may exercise more control over the conduct
of children than they may exercise over adults. Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). Moreover, because states have an exigent interest in preventing the distribution of objectionable material to children, states can control such distribution. Ginsburg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 at 635, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968) (holding "obscenity" as
applied to minors is a broader definition of "obscenity" as applied to
adults). For instance, states have regulated the sale of cigarettes, alcohol and firearms to minors. American Booksellers v. Rendell, 481 A.2d
919, 933 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (States also regulate a minor's operation of
automobiles, juvenile trials, and aspects of a minor's education, welfare
and employment.). Therefore, if a state chooses, it can regulate the dissemination of obscenity to children, because states may adjust7 the definition of "obscenity" in regulating its dissemination to minors.
7. Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 635-36; American Booksellers, 481 A.2d at 936 (The judiciary
and legislature of Pennsylvania have distinguished between children and adults in the obscenity context for years.).
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The regulation of child pornography is always permissible. Marshall
recognizes the greater harm which could be caused by the child pornography if accessed by minors. Thus, the Marshall statute protects its children at all stages of the child pornography process.
Here, the Domingos could assert that Gress did not take adequate
precautions to prevent minors from accessing his BBS. The fact that
Dede and Johnny Sawyer were both able to access "Kid Stuff' indicates
that Gress did not use adequate means to prevent such dissemination.
Gress should have exercised additional reasonable precautions since
"Kid Stuff' was certain to attract children's attention. Additional precautions are necessary when dealing with the Internet because BBS operators never see potential subscribers in person and children have been
targeted and encouraged to explore the Internet by the government and
by private operators. Elmer-DeWitt, at 54; Consequently, many children have greater access to pornography on the Internet than in bookstores or video stores.
Gress could have spoken with potential subscribers directly to approximate the age of the person. Also, he could have sent PIN numbers
through registered mail to subscribers, ensuring that the holder of the
driver's license or other identification would receive the number. (In this
case, Johnny Sawyer's older brother would have received the PIN.) Consequently, since Gress did not exercise these types of precautions the
Domingos will assert that Gress should be liable for the dissemination of
child pornography.
c.

Vicarious Liability

Even if this Court finds that Gress does not constitute the "creator"
of the pornography, and that Gress took adequate steps to prevent the
dissemination of the material to minors, the Domingos may argue that
this Court should hold Gress liable for the creation and dissemination of
child pornography through vicarious liability. As the operator of the
BBS, the Domingos will claim that Gress should be liable for ALL prohibited activity which occurs through use of his BBS. The Domingos will
assert that as sysop, Gress had complete control over the contents of his
BBS, subjecting him to liability. Moreover, Gress should be liable for
providing the instrumentality which makes the production of child pornography possible. Kelly v. Grinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
As operator or "sysop" of the BBS, the Domingos may assert that
8
Gress can be liable for the actions of users of his BBS. The Domingos
8. Sysops have been found liable for the posting of passwords, access numbers, credit
card numbers, and bank account numbers. Sysops have also been held responsible where
users have traded pirated software over their BBS, violated copyrights and targeted groups
of people for hate crimes. Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the Free market and the Free Mar-
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may argue that, as sysop, Gress is the person best able to control the
content of the material on his BBS, and thus should be liable for illegalities which occur on his BBS. Schlachter, supra, at p.4.
In Cubby Inc., a court found the operator, CompuServe, was not liable for actions on its BBS because there were three levels of suppliers: 1)
Compuserve, an on-line general information service; 2) special interest
"forums" within Compuserve which consisted of bulletin boards, and
other interactive online services, one of which was the "Journalism Forum" which was edited and controlled by a company not affiliated with
Compuserve; and 3) "Rumorville U.S.A," a BBS portion of the "Journalism Forum," which was published by another company not affiliated with
Compuserve. Cubby, Inc., v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). Compuserve lacked the authority to review the contents of "Rumorville" and did not receive a percentage of the fees that
"Rumorville" charged its users. Id. The only monies that Compuserve
received as a result of "Rumorville" were the on-line charge and membership fees that all Compuserve subscribers paid. Id. The action was instituted when another company began competing against "Rumorville."
"Rumorville" then printed alleged defamatory statements about the competitor, and the competitor sued Compuserve for the statements. Id. at
138.
The court explained that Compuserve "will have little or no editorial
control over the publication's contents." Id. at 140. The court looked at
four factors to determine Compuserve's level of control over
"Rumorville:" (1) Rumorville was responsible for regulating subscriptions to its BBS, (2) Rumorville reviewed the contents of the BBS, (3)
Rumorville directly received the revenues from the BBS, and (4) Compuserve had no notice of the illegal activity occurring. Id. The court held
that Compuserve acted as a distributor with minimal control over the
content of "Rumorville" and did not impose liability. Id. at 141.
Similarly, using Cubby, Inc. as a basis for analyzing Gress, the Domingos could assert that Gress possessed sufficient control over his BBS to
impose liability. Here, Gress was the only person who had control, like
the publisher of "Rumorville" in the Cubby case.
The Domingos may assert that, although users accessed Gress' BBS
through the Internet, they provided Gress, with the information needed
to subscribe to his BBS, Gress personally assigned a PIN to the user and
Gress was in charge of reviewing the contents of his BBS and had full
knowledge of the material offered through his BBS, unlike Compuserve.
Also, Gress, not Internet, had access to the BBS, could block or delete
ketplace of Ideas:Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16
HASTINGS CoM/ENT L.J. 87, at n.24, 25, 29 (1993); Jonathan Gilbert, Computer Bulletin
Board Operator Liability for User Misuse, 54 FORDHAm L. REv. 439 (1985).
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messages or new material which appeared and received all revenues
from his BBS.
Gress had complete control over the sale of "Kid Stuff' and received
an extra fee from users who paid to access "Kid Stuff." Additionally,
Gress had knowledge of the illegal activity occurring on his BBS. Gress
knew the program was capable of creating illegal material once in the
hands of any user. Thus, he knew that even if he did not personally
"create" prohibited material, illegal material would be created through
use of the program on his BBS.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
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II. WHETHER PETITIONER CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE CREATION AND DISSEMINATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
UNDER CHAPTER 45, SECTION III OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES WHEN HE OFFERED THE COMPUTER PROGRAM "KID STUFF" ON THE INTERNET?
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computer bulletin board do not portray minors
engaging in any of the sexual conduct prohibited
by chapter 45, section III of the Marshall
Revised Statutes ................................
3. The pictures taken by Mr. Gress were not of a
live sexual performance by a minor and thus do
not constitute pornography under Chapter 45,
section III of the Marshall Revised Statutes.....
4. The motion for judgment on the pleadings
against Mr. Gress must be denied because Mr.
Gress's computer program, taken as a whole,
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could reasonably be found to have scientific
value .... .... ..................................
B. The motion for judgment on the pleadings against
Petitionermust be denied as Petitioner'sactions did
not violate Chapter 45, section III of the Marshall
Revised Statutes since Petitionertook adequate
measures to prevent the disseminationof child
pornography to minors..............................
CON CLUSION ..................................................
APPEND IX A ...................................................
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OPINIONS BELOW
The order and opinion of the Melrose County Circuit Court is unreported. The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall is
set forth in the record. (R. at 1-9.)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction is omitted in accordance with §1020
(2) of the Rules of the John Marshall National Moot Court Competition.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Chapter 45, section III of the Marshall Revised Statutes, is the statute
relevant to the present action.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the
state of Marshall. (R. at 1.) The court of appeals affirmed the Melrose
County Circuit Court's order for judgment on the pleadings that the computer program "Kid Stuff' constituted prohibited material under the
laws of the state of Marshall. (R. at 9.) The court of appeals also affirmed
the lower court's finding that Petitioner ("Mr. Gress") was liable for the
creation and dissemination of the material at issue. (R. at 8, 9.) Mr.
Gress filed a timely notice of appeal and on June 5, 1994, this Court
granted Mr. Gress leave to appeal the order granting Douglas and Madeline Domingo's ("Respondents") motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Mr. Gress lives in the city of Melrose in the state of Marshall. (R. at
1.) Mr. Gress owns and operates a photography studio in the city of Melrose and specializes in photographing models for department stores and
mail-order catalogues. (R. at 1.) In addition to his work as a photographer, Mr. Gress is a skilled amateur computer programmer who, as a
hobby, is the operator or "sysop" of a bulletin board system ("BBS")
which can be accessed through the Internet. (R. at 1, 2.) As sysop, Mr.
Gress has managed the operations of the BBS, contributed material,
handled all subscriptions, inquiries and contributions to the BBS, conducted routine maintenance checks and checked the system for security
problems. (R. at 2.)
In February, 1993, Mr. Gress was hired to photograph children for
summer catalogues. (R.. at 2.) Mr. Gress set up the shots, posed the models and took the pictures. (R. at 2.) The photographs displayed youngsters in summer clothes, underwear and beach attire. (R. at 2.) Fifteen
year old, Dede Domingo, daughter of Respondents, was one of the teenagers employed by Mr. Gress as a model. (R. at 1, 2.) Ms. Domingo also
lives in the city of Melrose in the state of Marshall, where she resides
with Respondents. (R. at 1.) Respondents signed a release allowing Mr.
Gress to use Ms. Domingo's photographs only in specified catalogues. (R.
at 1, 2.) After Mr. Gress obtained Respondents' permission, he photographed, developed and printed the pictures for the specified clothing
catalogues. (R. at 2.) In addition to providing copies of the photographs
to Ms. Domingo for her portfolio, Mr. Gress retained copies for his own
files. (R. at 2.)
In May, 1993, Mr. Gress completed a computer program which he
made available on the BBS. (R. at 2.) The program was an interactive
application entitled "Kid Stuff." (R. at 2.) Mr. Gress was able to scan a
photograph of any person into his computer database and make that image part of the program. (R. at 2.) Mr. Gress used some of the pictures he
had taken for his catalogue work and scanned them into his computer,
including a bikini photo of Ms. Domingo. (R. at 2, 3.) Using his com-
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puter's graphics capabilities, Mr. Gress supplied the images with any
missing details. The user of the computer program then manipulated
these images to animate them and portray the life-like images in fictionalized sexual scenarios. (R. at 3.)
Mr. Gress instituted a security procedure for accessing and subscribing to his BBS. (R. at 3.) When someone using the Internet encounters
the BBS, the user has the option of entering or bypassing it. (R. at 3.)
When users enter the BBS, there are three minutes of free browsing time
in which they may familiarize themselves with the features available on
the BBS. (R. at 3.) In order to access the computer program Kid Stuff,
the user must satisfy a number of security measures including completing a questionnaire which appears on the screen, providing name, age
and address information to Mr. Gress; sending him a copy of the user's
driver's license or other identification showing proof of age; and paying
an extra monthly fee to access the computer program. After fulfilling
these requirements, Mr. Gress assigned a personal identifying number
(PIN) to each subscriber. (R. at 3.) Access to Kid Stuff was only possible
by entering the user's age and PIN. (R. at 3.)
In July, 1993, sixteen-year-old Johnny Sawyer, a friend of Ms. Domingo, logged onto his computer and while using Mr. Gress's BBS, learned
of the existence of Kid Stuff. (R. at 3.) He subscribed to Kid Stuff by
falsifying the BBS questionnaire with his twenty-two year old brother's
identification information. (R. at 4.) Mr. Sawyer also submitted a photocopy of his brother's driver's license to Mr. Gress along with the subscription fee. (R. at 4.)
On August 20, 1993, Mr. Sawyer logged onto Kid Stuff for the first
time, entering his PIN and "22" when the program asked the user's age.
(R. at 4.) After a few seconds the program ran a one minute explanation
describing exactly what a user was capable of doing with the program.
(R. at 4.) Then, a variety of children's images appeared on his monitor
and Mr. Sawyer was prompted to select a child's image and to select sexual acts in which the image would participate. (R.at 4.) When Ms. Domingo's image appeared on the screen, Mr. Sawyer immediately notified
her. (R. at 4.) He also told Ms. Domingo how to access Kid Stuff, supplying Ms. Domingo with his PIN and his brother's age. (R. at 4.)
Later that day, Ms. Domingo logged onto her computer and searched
for Kid Stuff on the BBS. (R.at 4.) Once Ms. Domingo found Kid Stuff
she typed in "22" and Mr. Sawyer's PIN and was prompted to run the
explanation, after which she was permitted to run the program. (R.at 4.)
Ms. Domingo saw her own image among the others and realized it could
be manipulated by the user in sexual scenarios with images of other people. (R.at 4, 5.) Ms. Domingo immediately informed Respondents. (R. at
5.)
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Respondents initiated a civil suit in the Melrose County Circuit
Court alleging violations of Chapter 45, Section III of the Marshall Revised Statutes. The Circuit Court granted Respondent's motion for
judgement on the pleadings. The Circuit Court's decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals of the state of Marshall. Mr. Gress appeals the
order of the Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall for two reasons.
First, the Marshall statute in question is unconstitutional. Second, even
if Kid Stuff can be constitutionally proscribed, Mr. Gress can not be held
liable for the creation and dissemination of the prohibited material.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Chapter 45, Section III of the Marshall Revised Statutes does not
withstand constitutional scrutiny and as such may not be applied to Mr.
Gress. The statute must be declared unconstitutional for a number of
reasons. First, the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Gress.
Because Mr. Gress's computer program is protected by the First Amendment and because Marshall lacks a compelling state interest, its regulation of Mr. Gress's computer program is improper. Additionally, the
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it violates computer
users' First Amendment rights by denying them access to constitutionally protected material. Further, the statute violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process of the law in that it fails to put
individuals on notice of the illegality of their conduct. The motion for a
finding against Mr. Gress based solely on the pleadings must therefore
be denied until these constitutional issues are resolved. Finally, interpreting the language of the statute in light of the facts shows that the
statute was not violated regardless of whether it is valid.
Mr. George Gress's creation and dissemination of his computer program Kid Stuff fall outside the scope of civil actions defined by the legislature in the state of Marshall. Mr. Gress's actions did not violate the
statute's language. His program does not meet the definition of child
pornography as defined by the statute's three criterion. No appeal to prurient interests can be inferred since no lascivious poses were presented
in the computer program's images. No children ever engaged in any pornographic activities during the program's creation. Finally, the computer program as a whole has scientific value.
Mr. Gress's act of posting his program Kid Stuff on his computer
bulletin board also would not violate the statute's prohibition of disseminating child pornography to minor's even if the program were pornographic. Mr. Gress took adequate measures to ensure that minors did
not gain access to the program as is required by the statute. Numerous
similar statutes describing security measures similar to Mr. Gress's further show that his measures were adequate. A motion for judgment on
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the pleadings against Mr. Gress can not be sustained in light of these
infirmities.
ARGUMENT
I.

CHAPTER 45, SECTION III OF THE MARSHALL REVISED
STATUTES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO MR.
GRESS AS IT IS OVERLY BROAD AND IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE ITS VAGUE
TERMINOLOGY VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF THE
LAW.

Chapter 45, Section III of the Marshall Revised Statutes' (the "Child
Pornography Law") must be declared unconstitutional because it suffers
from a number of constitutional infirmities. First, the Child Pornography Law is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Gress because it impermissibly regulates his constitutionally protected activity. Because Mr.
Gress's computer program does not pose the risks to children that are
associated with conventional child pornography, his computer program
is protected by the First Amendment. Protected activity may be regulated only upon the government demonstrating a compelling state interest. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1967). Because the government
lacks a compelling state interest in this instance, its regulation of Mr.
Gress's activity is unconstitutional.
Second, the Child Pornography Law is unconstitutional because it is
overly broad. In order for a statute to be invalidated as overly broad, the
overbreadth of the statute must not only be real but it must be substantial as well. Parkerv. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601 (1973). In the case at hand, the Child Pornography Law
violates the First Amendment rights of an entire class of persons.
Materials, such as Mr. Gress's computer program, which do not involve a
live performance of real children engaged in sexual conduct are protected
by the First Amendment. Because the Child Pornography Law prohibits
computer users from receiving this type of information, the statute violates computer users' First Amendment rights to receive information and
ideas in the privacy of their homes and their right to be free from unwanted government interference.
Finally, The Child Pornography Law violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process of the law. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a statute carefully
define the conduct it is to prohibit in order to put individuals on notice of
1. The pertinent parts of chapter 45, section III of the Marshall Revised Statutes are
attached hereto as exhibit A.
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the illegality of their activity. Furthermore, in examining statutes that
seek to regulate constitutionally protected material, the Supreme Court
noted that "[tihe Constitution requires proof of scienter to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material." Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966). The vague terminology of the Child
Pornography Law and the fact that it does not contain a mens rea requirement as to the conduct prohibited by it render the statute
unconstitutional.

A.

CHAPTER

45, SECTION III

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES IS

AS APPLIED TO MR. GREss BECAUSE IT

viOLATES MR. GRss'S RIGHT ro FREE ExPRESSION By
PROHIBITING HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE PROTECTED

UNDER THE FRsT AMENDMENT OF THE CoNsTIninON.

A state may regulate speech that is protected by the First Amendment only upon the showing of a compelling state interest. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1967); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Because Mr. Gress's computer program does not pose the risks to children
that the Child Pornography Law seeks to prevent, it retains First
Amendment protection. As such, Mr. Gress's computer program may be
regulated only if Marshall can demonstrate a compelling state interest.
Because Marshall has no compelling state interest, the prohibition of Mr.
Gress's computer program is unconstitutional.
1.

MR.

GRESS'S COMPUTER PROGRAM DOES NOT POSE THE RISKS TO

CHILDREN THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH CONVENTIONAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AND AS SUCH THE COMPUTER PROGRAM IS
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

Distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not
otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproductions of live performances, retain First
Amendment protection. New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
Mr. Gress's computer program does not involve either a live performance
or a reproduction of a live performance involving minors engaging in sexual conduct as described in the Child Pornography Law. Therefore, according to the standards established by the Supreme Court in Ferber,
Mr. Gress's program is protected by the First Amendment.
The significant leeway given to states in the regulation of child pornography is premised upon both the nature of the danger posed to children by participation in the child pornography industry and the state's
compelling interest in the protection of its children. Ferber, 458 U.S. at
737. However, Mr. Gress's program does not pose the risks associated
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with the child pornography industry that are the subject of regulation by
Marshall's Child Pornography Law. While numerous courts and commentators have acknowledged that the use of children as subjects of pornographic material is harmful to the physiological, emotional and mental
well-being of a child, a fact that is not disputed, such harm is not present
in the computer program produced by Mr. Gress. See Schoettle, Child
Exploitation:A Study of Child Pornography,19 J. AM. AcAD.

CHILD

PSY-

289, 296 (1980).
The harm sought to be curtailed by child pornography laws is the
sexual and physical subjugation of children for the purposes of engaging
them in actual sexual conduct or for the purposes of engaging them in
conduct that simulates such sexual activity. See Schoettle, 19 J. AM.
CHIATRY

AcAD.

CHILD

PsYcHIATRY 289 at 296. While "photographs and films de-

picting sexual activity by juveniles [are] intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children," it is not the resulting photograph that harms the
child but rather the participation in the conduct giving rise to such photograph that harms the child. Ferber,458 U.S. at 737. The harm attendant most child pornography results from the minor's engaging in sex, be
it simulated or actual. While the resulting photograph serves as a permanent record of the abuse, the actual abuse occurs in the child's participation in the sexual conduct that is the subject of the photo. In Mr.
Gress's program, Ms. Domingo never engaged in any such conduct. Ms.
Domingo was never forced to humiliate herself by striking sexually
graphic poses or by engaging in sexual conduct. Rather, Ms. Domingo
posed for a child's clothing catalogue - an activity that poses no risk of
harm to Ms. Domingo. At no time was Ms. Domingo exposed to any of
the dangers that the Marshall legislature sought to protect children from
when enacting its Child Pornography Law.
In order to further Marshall's compelling interest in protecting children within the bounds of the Constitution, the Child Pornography Law
must be narrowly construed such that it prohibits only the photographing or depicting of actual children that are engaged in sexual conduct at
the time the photograph or depiction is created. In construing a state
law prohibiting the possession or control of material "depicting a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct," Georgia's highest court restricted
the prohibition to material that used real children as actors. Aman v.
Georgia, 409 S.E.2d 645, 646 (Ga. 1991). The court noted that "the statutory term 'depict a minor' must be understood as limited to any photographic representation that was made of a human being who at the time
was a minor and was engaged in any sexually explicit conduct." Aman,
409 S.E.2d at 646. A member of the court also noted in commenting on
the state's interest in regulating child pornography that
the interest is served by banning the possession of child pornography
that is based on the use of a live child model. [The state's interest] is
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not served, nor is there a legitimate basis for, legislation prohibiting
other clearly constitutionally protected materials which "depict" a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Id. at 647. By requiring that the prohibition apply only to material that
depicts real children engaged in actual or simulated sexual conduct, the
court narrowly tailored the statute to serve the state's compelling interest. It follows that where no real children are used to engage in actual or
simulated sex, the material retains First Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court has suggested that simulations not involving
real children would be constitutionally sound alternatives to the use of
real children in sexually explicit material. Mr. Gress's computer program comports with the very alternative suggested by the Court in Ferber. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763. The Ferber Court, noted that "simulation
outside of the prohibition of the statute could provide another alternative." Id.
The statute at issue in Ferber prohibited the inducing of a child to
engage in a sexual performance. By using a computer to manipulate an
image of a child, a sexually explicit image can be created without the
child ever engaging in a sexual performance. It follows that such an image is outside of the prohibition of the statute because it does not pose
that type of harm sought to be prevented by the statute. Therefore, in
order to be within the ambit of the statute, the sexual performance must
involve real children. Mr. Gress at no time photographed or filmed real
children engaging in actual or simulated sexual conduct of the types enumerated in the Child Pornography Law. Therefore, Mr. Gress's computer program complies with the guidelines established in Ferber as an
alternative to the use of minors in the production of child pornography.
Because Mr. Gress's photographs of Ms. Domingo do not involve live performances and because there was never any live performance by Ms.
Domingo to be reproduced, his computer program is entitled to First
Amendment protection.
2.

CHAPTER

45,

SECTION

III

OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES

VIOLATES MR. GRESS'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT BECAUSE THE
STATUTE PROHIBITS MR. GRESS'S CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED ACTIVITY.

Marshall's attempt to regulate activity that is protected by the First
Amendment is not supported by Supreme Court precedent. A state law
proscribing activity that is protected by the First Amendment will survive constitutional scrutiny only if the state's interest in prohibiting the
speech is so compelling as to outweigh the constitutionally protected interest of free speech. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 562-65 (1964);
American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1326
(S.D.Ind. 1984). Marshall lacks a compelling state interest in prohibit-
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ing Mr. Gress's computer program. Mr. Gress's computer program does
not pose the risk of physiological, emotional or mental harm that is associated with child pornography involving live performances by real children or reproductions of such performances. Mr. Gress never
photographed any live performance by Ms. Domingo involving sexual
conduct of the type proscribed by the Child Pornography Law. The lack
of any compelling state interest as applied to Mr. Gress removes this
case from the ambit of Supreme Court decisions such as Osborne and
Ferber,in which a compelling state interest was identified. See Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
The case at hand is analogous to and governed by decisions such as
American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. and Stanley, in which the lack of a compelling state interest was deemed persuasive as to the unconstitutionality of the statutes at issue.
In American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., the Southern District of Indiana
invalidated an Indianapolis municipal anti-pornography ordinance because the city could not demonstrate a compelling interest in the regulation of pornographic material that used words or pictures to depict
women in sexually subordinate roles. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.,
598 F. Supp. at 1329. While the court noted that the city may properly
regulate material that falls within the ambit of "obscenity" as defined in
Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15 (1973), the city could regulate protected
speech only upon a showing of a compelling state interest. American
Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 598 F. Supp. at 1326.
The court rejected the city's argument that pornographic material
subjects women to sexual discrimination and that women were in need of
special protection. The court emphasized that although the protection of
women's civil rights was a legitimate state interest, women, unlike the
children in Ferber, were capable of protecting their own civil rights and
were in no need of special protection. Id. at 1333-34. Therefore, in the
absence of any compelling state interest the court found that an abridgment of the First Amendment right implicit in protected speech was not
warranted. Id. A similar situation is present in the case at hand. No one
disputes the legitimate interest that Marshall has in protecting the wellbeing of children. However, because Mr. Gress's computer program
poses no threat to children, Marshall has no compelling state interest
that would warrant its abridgment of Mr. Gress's First Amendment
right.
In Stanley, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia statute that
sought to criminalize the possession of obscene material in the privacy of
one's home. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559-64. The Court held that Georgia had
no compelling interest in the regulation of its citizens' minds nor did the
Court find that possession of such material would lead to antisocial or
deviant activity by the possessor. Id. at 565-68. The Court concluded
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that in the absence of a compelling state interest, the placement of restrictions upon the consumption of free ideas was not warranted. Id.
Neither is a similar prohibition warranted in the case at bar. Mr. Gress's
computer program simply does not impose upon children the risks associated with child pornography that served as predicates for the compelling state interest in cases upholding the constitutionality of child
pornography laws. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757-58; Osborne, 495 U.S. at
109. Because there is no compelling state interest in the case at hand,
the infringement upon Mr. Gress's First Amendment right is unwarranted and as such is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's decision in Osborne is distinguishable from the
case at bar and must be limited to the context in which it was decided.
In Osborne, there was present the compelling interest of the state in protecting the "physical and psychological well-being of a minor" because
the material at issue involved reproductions of live performances. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109. Therefore, despite the constitutionally protected
nature of the material prohibited, the Court upheld the validity of the
child pornography law. However, Marshall lacks the compelling state
interest identified by the Court in Osborne. In the absence of such state
interest, Marshall may not regulate Mr. Gress's activity.
Invalidation of the child pornography law, as applied to Mr. Gress, is
also consistent with the Supreme Court's upholding of a child pornography statute in Ferber. The Supreme Court, in examining New York's
child pornography law, held that such a statute was entitled to significant leeway in any constitutional adjudication. Ferber,458 U.S. at 756.
However, the Court noted that this leeway was premised upon the interest in protecting children and was not without limits. Id. Such leeway
should end when the compelling state interest is not present. Because
such compelling interest was present in Ferber, regulation of the otherwise constitutionally protected material was tolerated by the Court.
However, Mr. Gress's program is unlike the situation present in Ferber.
Because no compelling state interest is present in the case at issue, regulation of Mr. Gress's constitutionally protected activity is not warranted.
In Ferber, the Supreme Court provided that where a statute proscribes constitutionally protected speech in the course of its valid regulation of other non-protected speech, "whatever overbreadth may exist
should be cured through a case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to
which its sanctions, assertedly, may be applied." Id. at 770. This case
presents such a "fact situation" where it is necessary to declare the statute unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Gress.
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CHAP ER 45, sEcTIoN III OF 27m MARsHALL REwsED STATUTES Is
OVERLY BROAD AND SHOULD BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE ITS
APPLICATIONr REACHES A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED A CTIVITIES.

The scope of the Child Pornography Law is so broad as to prohibit a
real and substantial number of constitutionally protected activities.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973). The overbreadth doctrine is premised upon the notion that
"persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may refrain from
exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanction by a statute susceptible to application to protected expression." Village of Schaumbrug v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980). The overbreadth
doctrine is an exception to the traditional rule that prohibits a person to
whom a statute may constitutionally be applied from challenging the
statute on the grounds that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court. Broadrick, 413 U.S.
601 (1973). Therefore, regardless of the validity of the application the
Child Pornography Law to Mr. Gress, he may challenge the statute as
unconstitutionally overly broad upon a showing of a substantial number
of impermissible applications of the statute to the rights of individuals
not presently before this Court.
The Child Pornography Law at issue poses precisely the situation
where the expansive reach of the statute results in an intolerable chilling effect upon individuals' exercise of their First Amendment rights.
More specifically, the Child Pornography Law violates computer users'
First Amendment rights to receive information and ideas and their right
to be free from unwanted government intrusions. This impairment of an
entire class of persons' First Amendment rights is both real and substantial and mandates that this court declare the Child Pornography Law
unconstitutional.

1.

CHAPTER 45, SECTION III OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES
PREVENTS COMPUTER USERS FROM RECEIVING IN THEIR HOMES
INFORMATION THAT IS PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, THEREBY VIOLATING COMPUTER USERS'
RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION AND IDEAS.

The Child Pornography Law violates the well established constitutional right to receive information and ideas. Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The right to receive information and
ideas is protected by the First Amendment regardless of the social value
of the ideas or information conveyed. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566 ("the line
between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too
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elusive for this court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all.");
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Therefore, regardless of
the social value of Mr. Gress's computer program, computer users have a
First Amendment right to receive such information in the privacy of
their own homes.
Because computer programs, such as Mr. Gress's, are protected by
the First Amendment, any statute that prohibits the creation or dissemination of such material impermissibly infringes upon a computer user's
First Amendment right to receive such information. Stanley, 394 U.S. at
566. Mr. Gress created and maintained the computer program Kid Stuff
on his own home computer. In order to utilize the program, other computer users, working from the privacy of their own homes, must access
Mr. Gress's computer. However, the Child Pornography Law prevents
such computer users from accessing computer programs that are maintained on a non-commercial private bulletin board contained on an individual's home computer. The computer user has a right to receive
information and ideas via his home computer regardless of the offensive
nature of the information in much the same fashion that Stanley had a
right to view obscene movies in the privacy of his own home. Id. The
Child Pornography statute impermissibly infringes upon this right.
2.

CHAPTER

45,

SECTION III OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES

CONSTITUTES AN IMPERMISSIBLE INTRUSION BY THE
GOVERNMENT INTO THE HOMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND AS
SUCH VIOLATES COMPUTER USERS' RIGHT TO BE FREE
FROM UNWANTED GOVERNMENT INTRUSIONS.

The prohibition imposed upon Mr. Gress by the Child Pornography
Law also violates Mr. Gress's right to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928). The First Amendment prevents the government
from interfering in the individual's right to "satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home." Stanley, 394 U.S. at
565. The Supreme Court stated "[if the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or what ifims he may watch."
Id. Nor may the government tell such man what computer programs
may be written, disseminated or utilized in the privacy of his own home.
The computer program at issue was created and maintained in the privacy of Mr. Gress's home. Moreover, the users of his computer bulletin
board, like Stanley, use such computer programs in the privacy of their
own homes. The state of Marshall has no more right to censor or prohibit the contents of an individual's home computer than Georgia had a
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right to inquire into the contents of Stanley's library. Id. Any effort by
Marshall to censor or prohibit what material may be received by computer users constitutes an impermissible intrusion by the state and violates such computer users' right to be free from unwanted government
intrusions.
C.

CHAPTER 45, SECTION III OF THE MARSHALL REwSED STATUTES
VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTHAMENDMENT GUARANrTEE OF DUE
PROCESS OF THE LA W IN THAT THE VAGUEAESS OF THE
STATUTE AND ITS LACK OF ANY SCIEWTER ELEMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT PROSCRIBED BY IT DOES NOT PUT INDIVDUALS ON
NOTICE OF THE PROHIBITION OF THEIR ACTIVITY

The broad statutory language used in the Child Pornography Law
does not put an individual on notice as to the prohibition of the conduct it
is intended to encompass. The vagueness of the statute is further magnified by the failure of Marshall to include a scienter element as to the
conduct prohibited. The resulting strict liability can be avoided only if
an individual chooses not to create such material thereby engaging in
precisely the chilling self-censorship that the right to due process seeks
to avoid. As such the Child Pornography Law violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and must be declared unconstitutional.
1.

CHAPTER 45, SECTION III OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES
DOES NOT DEFINE THE PROHIBITED CONDUCT WITH A SUFFICIENT
DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY TO PUT INDIVIDUALS ON NOTICE OF
THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR CONDUCT.

The Child Pornography Law does not sufficiently define the conduct
that it is intended to prohibit. In order to avoid the overly broad application of a statute, courts have required that statutes adequately define
the conduct to be prohibited. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764
(1982); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); United States v.
Long, 831 F. Supp. 582, 587 (W.D. Ky. 1993). The clearer the definition
of the prohibited conduct, the less likely it is that the statute will have a
chilling effect on an individual's exercise of their First Amendment right.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
Paragraph B of the Child Pornography Law defines the prohibited conduct that constitutes the creation of child pornography. Marshall includes in this definition any person who "portrays by means of any visual
medium.., any child whom he or she knows. .. to be under the age of
eighteen..." engaged in prohibited sexual conduct. Chapter 45, Section
III, Paragraph B of the Marshall Revised Statutes. It follows from the
broad definition of the term "portray" that use of virtually any medium
in a visual manner to depict children engaged in sexual conduct would
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result in the creation of child pornography, regardless of whether the
portrayal posed any actual danger to the children depicted.
The vague definition of prohibited conduct includes a significant
number of portrayals that pose none of the risks sought to be avoided by
child pornography statutes. Such a broad definition poses considerable
risks to individuals that create material portraying children engaged in
sexual conduct if such material is created without the use of live performances or reproductions thereof. In the absence of such clear statutory guidance, individuals, such as Mr. Gress, must resort to selfcensoring in an effort to avoid violating the statute. Mr. Gress's computer program is but one example of a portrayal that does not pose a risk
to children but that falls squarely within the broad ambit of paragraph
B's vague definition.
While the Child Pornography statute encompasses a significant
quantity of material that should properly be deemed child pornography,
distinct limitations must be placed upon such categorization so that individuals may adjust their conduct accordingly. The Supreme Court has
noted that there are "limits on the category of child pornography which,
like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment." Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 764. In Ferber, the Court suggested that simulations not involving a
live performance or a reproduction of a live performance would serve to
limit the material prohibited by the statute. Id. No such limitation can
be read into Marshall's statute and individuals may not adjust their conduct accordingly. As such the Child Pornography Law is not "narrowly
tailored to further the State's legitimate interest," and must fail because
of vagueness. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The vagueness
surrounding the statute is further exacerbated by the lack of any scienter element as to the conduct that the statute prohibits.

2.

CHAPTER

45,

SECTION III OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES

DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SCIENTER ELEMENT AS TO THE CONDUCT
IT PROSCRIBES.

The Child Pornography Law is unconstitutional because it fails to
provide a mens rea requirement for the conduct prohibited by the statute. It is well established that the First Amendment mandates that a
criminal statute prohibiting the distribution of child pornography must
contain a mens rea for the prohibited conduct. Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502, 511 (1966) ("[tlhe Constitution requires proof of scienter to
avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material."); United States v. Colavito, 19 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1994); United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1186 (1994); United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990). The requirement of scienter has been
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found to be equally applicable in civil statutes as well. See United States
v. Buena Vista, - U.S. -, 113 U.S. 1126 (1993); United States v. One
1990 Lincoln Town Car, 817 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (real property
not subject to forfeiture where lienholder lacked actual knowledge of
fraud).
Although most decisions passing upon the issue of scienter have
dealt with its application to the minority of the child participants, the
chilling effect of self-censorship is equally dangerous when a statute
lacks scienter as to the conduct prohibited. The Child Pornography Law
does contain a scienter requirement as to the minority of the participant.
However, the statute lacks any scienter element as to the conduct that
constitutes the creation or dissemination of child pornography. This
shortcoming has a particularly acute effect on Mr. Gress because of the
manner in which the material at issue was produced. Mr. Gress did not
have knowledge that he was creating child pornography. Mr. Gress
merely created a program that has the capability to produce images of
children engaged in sexual conduct. Ultimately, it is the user of the program who is responsible for the selection and manipulation of these
images. Without requiring that Mr. Gress know, or have some other
mens rea, that the conduct will create child pornography, the statute impermissibly imposes strict liability upon Mr. Gress and results in the
chilling effect of self-censorship.
II.

ACCORDING TO CHAPTER 45, SECTION III, PARAGRAPHS B
AND C OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES,
PETITIONER NEITHER CREATED NOR
DISSEMINATED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
BECAUSE HIS COMPUTER PROGRAM DOES NOT FALL
WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE STATUTE.

The Marshall court was incorrect in deciding that Mr. Gress's activities were proscribed by the Child Pornography Law. The photographs
that Mr. Gress created did not have as their focus an obsessive interest
in immoral or lascivious matters nor an excessive or unnatural interest
in sex. Rather, the photos that Mr. Gress took were of children in beach
attire and undergarments. In no way could these pictures have encouraged lustful or lewd thoughts in the average person applying community standards. Furthermore, the photographs, as altered, did not
depict sexual conduct under the Child Pornography Law.
The pictures did not depict fornication, sadomasochistic sexual acts,
masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals. A
specific six factor test has been endorsed by the Third Circuit to decide if
a work is "lascivious." See United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.
1989). Of the six factors outlined in Villard, only one, the fact that the
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models are nude, is satisfied by Mr. Gress's altered photographs. The
courts have repeatedly argued that mere nudity does not constitute pornography. See United States v. Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803, 811 (D. N.J.)
affd 885 F.2d at 126 (1988) (Roth, J., dissenting on other grounds);
United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), afrd, 813 F.2d
1231 (9th Cir. 1987); Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp.
1341 (N.D. Texas 1985), affd 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied
479 U.S. 1088 (1987). Finally, the pictures did not portray a live performance of sexual conduct or a simulation of a live performance of sex or
lascivious expression, which is a requirement under Ferber. See New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
Mr. Gress complied with the mandates of the Child Pornography
Law with respect to dissemination by undertaking security measures
that were adequate. Mr. Gress took numerous precautions to prevent
minors from subscribing to Kid Stuff, including the screening of users
and requiring proof of age. Strict liability should not be inferred by the
statute which requires "adequate" measures and proscribes "reckless"
behavior. Because Mr. Gress made a bona fide attempt to ascertain the
age of the minor and curtail their use of Kid Stuff, absolute liability can
not apply to restrict the distribution of information via the Internet.
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
HAD CREATED CHILD PORNOGRAPY UNDER CHAPTER
SECTION III OF rHE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES.

MR.

GREss

45,

According to the plain meaning of the Child Pornography Law, Mr.
Gress did not create child pornography. Paragraph B of the Child Pornography Law provides the definition of what conduct constitutes the
creation of child pornography. Paragraph A further qualifies this definition by requiring that the conduct meet a standard similar to the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
When interpreting the meaning of any statute, one must look first at the
plain meaning of the words that comprise the statute. It is axiomatic
that when the statutory language is clear, the words must be interpreted
in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Malloy v. Eichler, 860 F.2d
1179, 1183 (3d Cir. 1988). Only the most extraordinary showing of contrary congressional intent may justify altering the plain meaning of the
statute. Id. There exists no legislative history for the Marshall statute
and, as such, the plain meaning rule must be applied. If the language of
a statute is clear, it is assumed that the intention is expressed by the
words themselves and therefore there is no need to construe the statute.
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1.

PETITIONER'S COMPUTER PROGRAM DOES NOT SATISFY THE PLAIN
MEANING OF THE THREE STANDARDS REQUIRED BY CHAPTER 45,
SECTION

III

OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES.

The Child Pornography Law sets forth three standards, all of which
must be met, in order for conduct to constitute child pornography. See
Chapter 45, Section III, Paragraph A of the Marshall Revised Statutes.
The first prong of the test is whether the material in question appeals to
the prurient interest. "Prurient" is defined as "tending to excite lust;

lewd."

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY

481 (David B. Guralnick ed.,

1983). "Prurient interest" is defined as "a shameful or morbid interest in
nudity, sex or excretion.., an obsessive interest in immoral or lascivious
matters ... [or] an excessive or unnatural interest in sex." BLAC's LAw
DICTIONARY

1226 (6th ed. 1990).

In Miller the "prurient interest standard" was developed by the
United States Supreme Court. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact in that case were (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, "appeals to the prurient interest" (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a "patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law;" and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. at 24. While this standard generally does not apply to
child pornography, it does closely parallel the Marshall Child Pornography Law. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
It seems clear that with respect to the "prurient interest" standard,
the pictures taken by Mr. Gress, which were subsequently altered, would
not rise to the level of prurience in the eye of the "average person, apply[ing] contemporary community standards." Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
The photographs that Mr. Gress took of children in summer attire and
underwear do not in any way conjure up lustful thoughts for an average
viewer. Even the nude photographs which Mr. Gress created with a computer do not have as their focus a shameful or morbid interest in sex.
One must bear in mind that it is the computer program user that
manipulates the images to simulate sexual conduct. The subject matter,
created by Mr. Gress, therefore, fails the first prong of the Child Pornography Law.
2.

THE PHOTOGRAPHS THAT MR. GRESS SUPPLIED TO THE COMPUTER
BULLETIN BOARD DO NOT PORTRAY MINORS ENGAGING IN ANY OF
THE SEXUAL CONDUCT PROHIBITED BY CHAPTER 45,
SECTION

III

OF THE MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES.

The second element of the Child Pornography Law dealing with
what constitutes sexual conduct under the statute is more complicated.
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The pictures created by Mr. Gress did not depict fornication, sadomasochistic sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition
of the genitals. As to what constitutes a "lewd exhibition of the genitals,"
the Third Circuit, relying on the district court for the Southern District
of California, has outlined a workable definition of this terminology. See
United States v.Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989).
In United States v. Dost, the Southern California district court held
that two photographs taken by the defendants violated the federal Child
Protection Act, which prohibited the taking of photographs of a minor
engaging in "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area." United
States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Ca. 1986), aftd 813 F.2d 1231 (9th
Cir. 1987). In Dost, the court made the distinction between "lewd" and
"lascivious," where the federal law had adopted a definition of sexual
conduct that included "lascivious exhibition of the genitals." Id. at 1243.
However, in a more recent case, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Wiegand, understood the terms "lascivious" and "lewd" to be interchangeable. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987). The Child Pornography Law, however,
seems to follow the guidelines of the obscenity standard outlined in
Miller and, thus, any photographs analyzed under the Child Pornography Law should rise to the level of obscenity to qualify as child
pornography.
However, if the Supreme Court of Marshall refuses to embrace the
obscenity standard for child pornography, the Dost test provides a succinct definition of what constitutes a "lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area." The District Court in Dost explained that the following
factors should be considered in determining what lascivious means:
" Whether the focal point of visual depiction was on minor's genitaha or pubic area;
• Whether setting of visual depiction was sexually suggestive;
" Whether minor was depicted in unnatural pose or in inappropriate attire considering his or her age;
" Whether child was fully or partially clothed or nude;
" Whether visual depiction suggested sexual coyness or willingness
to engage in sexual activity; and
" Whether visual depiction was intended or designed to elicit sexual
response in viewer.
Id. at 832. In a Third Circuit case decided three years after Dost, the
language of the statute makes clear that the depictions must consist of
more than mere nudity; otherwise, inclusion of the term "lascivious"
would be meaningless. Villard, 885 F.2d at 117.
The Court noted that the "lascivious exhibition" determination must
be made on a case-by-case basis using general principles as guides for
analysis. Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 831-832. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
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has noted that child pornography is not created when the pedophile derives sexual enjoyment from an otherwise innocent photo. Wiegand, 812
F.2d at 1245. In Wiegand, the court held that "[pirivate fantasies are not
within the statute's ambit." Id. at 1245. "When a picture does not constitute child pornography, even though it portrays nudity, it does not become child pornography because it is placed in the hands of a pedophile,
or in a forum where pedophiles might enjoy it." Faloonav. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affd 799 F.2d 1000 (5th
Cir. 1986). In Gress's case, the mere placing of non-pornographic material on the computer bulletin board, thereby supplying nude pictures in a
forum where pedophiles might enjoy it, does not constitute the creation
or production of child pornography, even if such images are later
manipulated by computer users to create pornographic scenes.
In applying the Dost test to the case at bar, it is important to keep in
mind that the photographs taken by Mr. Gress were of children in bathing suits and undergarments. There were no nude pictures taken of minors; rather, the nude pictures were created by a computer program.
Furthermore, it was the computer program user that manipulated the
images in order to depict scenes involving sexual conduct. If the analysis
begins with Mr. Gress's final product, namely, the altered images of children who are nude, it is impossible to find a showing of a "lewd exhibition of the genitals" in the instant case. The materials that Mr. Gress
created did not have as their focal point a visual depiction of the minors
genitalia, the setting was not sexually suggestive, the minor was not depicted in an unnatural pose or in inappropriate attire, the visual depiction suggested neither sexual coyness nor willingness to engage in sexual
activity, nor was the photograph in and of itself designed to elicit sexual
response in the viewer. Of the six factors in Dost, only the fourth, the
fact that the child was nude, is relevant. However, the court acknowledges that in determining the depiction of a "lascivious exhibition of the
genitals" a jury is called upon often to make a more careful evaluation
based on subtle visible nuances. "This is because the law does not prohibit.., visual depictions of mere nudity." Villard, 700 F. Supp. at 811.
Mr. Gress was never involved in the manipulation of the figures
through the computer program Kid Stuff. It is the subscriber to the BBS
who is creating simulated child pornography. The requirement of more
than mere nudity does not mean that nudity is a prerequisite to the
existence of child pornography. Rather, as in Villard, the court simply
stated the obvious principle that nudity alone is insufficient to constitute
a lascivious exhibition. No one seriously could think that a painting of a
nude child or a snapshot of a naked child in a bathtub violates the Child
Pornography Law. Nudity must be coupled with other circumstances
that make the visual depiction lascivious or sexually provocative in order
to fall within the parameters of the statute. United States v. Knox, 977
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F.2d 815, 820-21 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2926, and vacated,
114 S. Ct. 375 (1993). It is the introduction of the bulletin board user
who manipulates the computer program that imbues Mr. Gress' product
with a lascivious nature. Respondents would be better served by attaching blame to these parties rather than Mr. Gress himself. In United
States v. Cross, the Eleventh Circuit held that photographs of nude children that did not portray the models as sexually coy or inviting were
nevertheless deemed to be lascivious because the defendant had arranged them to satisfy the sexual interest of himself and other
pedophiles. United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 594 (1991). Again, Mr. Gress's photographs were not arranged in any particular order but were selected by the computer
program user to simulate sexual conduct.
In Faloona v.Hustler Magazine, Inc., the district court for the
Northern District of Texas, affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, held that nude
pictures of the plaintiffs were not "child pornography" under Ferber, because they did not show the plaintiffs engaged in any sexual activity or
in a lewd exhibition of their genitals. Faloonav. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
607 F. Supp. 1341, 1342, n.4 (N.D. Texas 1985) affd 799 F.2d 1000 (5th
Cir. 1986). In Faloona,minors, joined by their mother, brought an invasion of privacy action against that magazine which published the minors'
nude pictures after they had appeared in what plaintiffs determined to
be an artistic and educational book about sexuality called The Sex Atlas.
Faloona, 607 F. Supp. at 1343-44. The district court held that the nude
pictures did not portray children engaged in sexual conduct. "Accordingly, neither the publication of the plaintiffs nude pictures in Hustler
nor their publication in The Sex Atlas constituted child pornography, as
defined in Ferber."Id. at 1345.
In Faloona, the plaintiffs asserted that a release which had been
signed was void as an illegal contract because it permitted the publication of "child pornography" - i.e., the nude pictures of the plaintiffs - in
Hustler.Id. at 1344. "The nude photographs of the plaintiffs - admired,
and admittedly not obscene, when published in The Sex Atlas - did not
become 'child pornography' when they appeared in Hustler."Id. at 1355,
n. 44. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' desire to censor Hustler
could not be reconciled with the constitutional protections of free speech.
They went on to say that a successful censoring of Hustler, would necessarily extend to books like The Sex Atlas and other works of scientific or
literary value merely because they contained pictures of nude children.
In Mr. Gress's case, none of the children he photographed were depicted engaging in any sexual acts. Rather, the pictures that he created
were merely pictures of nude children, which do not constitute child pornography as defined by the Supreme Court in Ferber. Similarly, the pictures that Mr. Gress created when incorporated into the Kid Stuff
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program did not become child pornography. The photographs can not be
characterized as pornographic merely because of the subject matter of
the computer program. In fact, it remains the province of the user of Kid
Stuff to manipulate the photographs and this manipulation is not in any
way conducted under the dominion and control of Mr. Gress. Furthermore, as articulated in Faloona,the courts must tread carefully in matters where the First Amendment protections of speech and press may
block efforts at censorship. Faloona,607 F. Supp. at 1360. Mr. Gress did
not create child pornography when he altered the photographs of the
children and neither did the inclusion of the nude photographs in Kid
Stuff alter their character. The courts should carefully assess who, in
fact, is the creator of child pornography in a case like the one at bar and
award damages based on that assessment. In Mr. Gress's case, the creator of child pornography is the user of Kid Stuff.

3.

THE PICTURES TAKEN BY

MR. GRESS

WERE NOT OF A LIVE SEXUAL

PERFORMANCE BY A MINOR AND THUS DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PORNOGRAPHY UNDER CHAPTER

45,

SECTION

III

OF THE

MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES.

As previously outlined, the Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982), provided judicial authority for deciding cases that
involved child pornography. The Ferber court concentrated primarily on
the use of real children as subjects in the creation of child pornography.
There is little doubt that where a child is made to engage in these sexual
acts listed in the Child Pornography Law or is encouraged to act lasciviously in exhibiting his or her genitalia, physical and/or emotional harm
will result. However, in the case of Dede Domingo, she was never made
to perform sexual acts or to lasciviously exhibit her genitalia.
In fact, as previously discussed, the Ferber court made an important
distinction with respect to live performances. The Supreme Court held
that "distributions of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct,
not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other reproduction of live performances by children retain
First Amendment protection." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. In Ferber, the
nature of the harm to be combated required that the state offense be
limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a
specified age. Id. The visual depictions that are the subject of this appeal
do not involve a live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances by children. Furthermore, the offense must
be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct, which these pictures do not. The materials created by Gress retain First Amendment
protection under the Ferber rationale and, because of this protection, do
not constitute child pornography under the Child Pornography Law.
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THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AGAINST MR. GRESS
MUST BE DENIED BECAUSE MR. GRESS'S COMPUTER PROGRAM,
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, COULD REASONABLY BE FOUND TO
HAVE SCIENTIFIC VALUE.

The Child Pornography Law exempts works that have "scientific
value" from those that can be considered child pornography. This language is similar to the language in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), where the Supreme Court held that, with regard to obscene material, the
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b)

whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. While the Ferber court did not change the
standard used to determine what material has scientific value, the
Supreme Court held that the "contemporary community standards" application is not relevant to the determination of serious value. "The
proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community would find serious value in the allegedly obscene material but
whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material,
taken as a whole." Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). Since the Child
Pornography Law uses the words scientific value, the same standard
must apply. Shannon v. United States, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426
(1994) ("[A] court, in interpreting "borrowed" statutory language, should
apply the same construction to that language that was placed upon it by
the courts in the jurisdiction from which it was borrowed.").
Applying the Miller standard to Mr. Gress's work, the demonstration of high technology computer graphics, could certainly be of scientific
value. "Taken as a whole," as suggested by Miller, the computer program demonstrates graphics capable of remarkable animation and versatility. One must examine the technology utilized to create these
images and not the images themselves. A Louisiana court employed precisely this analysis in examining a magazine that contained pornographic pictures. The court concluded that a magazine, taken as whole,
could not be said to lack serious political or scientific or literary value
beyond a reasonable doubt, even though the magazine depicted hard core
sexual conduct which appealed to prurient interest. State v. Walden Book
Co., 386 So. 2d 342 (La. 1980). The intellectual process of applying what
one has seen or experienced to other uses is critical to the process of technological development. These types of innovations must not be stifled
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because of the subject matter of the material. As such, a jury could find
that Mr. Gress's work has serious scientific value.
B.

THE MOTION AOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AGAINST PETITONWR
MUST BE DENIED AS PETITIONER'S ACTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE

CHAPTER

45, SECTION III

OF THE MARSHALL STATUTE

SINCE PETITIONER TOOK ADEQUATE MEASURES TO
PREVENT THE DISSEMINATIONV OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY Y19 MINORS.

Mr. Gress's actions do not represent dissemination to minors based
on the language of the Marshall Statute. The statutory language of Paragraph C of the Child Pornography Law does not require that security
measures be fool-proof but rather "adequate." Because of the lack of case
law and legislative history regarding the interpretation of the word adequate, similar statutes must be examined. Mr. Gress's measures for
preventing minors' access to his computer program were adequate and
thus he did not disseminate child pornography under the Child Pornography Law.
Simply because minors could gain access to Kid Stuff does not, ipso
facto, imply that Mr. Gress's security measures were inadequate. Paragraph C of the Child Pornography Law requires that a person take "adequate means to prevent the dissemination" of child pornography to
minors. Chapter 45, Section III, Paragraph C of the Marshall Revised
Statutes. In the case at bar, Mr. Gress took numerous precautions to
prevent minors from gaining access to his computer program. He required that potential users fill out a questionnaire affirming their age,
mail in a copy of their driver's license or other identification showing
proof of their age, and pay a fee. These measures place a substantial
burden on an underage user who would have to misrepresent himself, as
did the minors in the instant case, in order to gain access.
Furthermore, the court should hold in Mr. Gress's favor because the
language of the Child Pornography Law does not define the word adequate. Interpretation of the word "adequate" within the statute is necessary to determine whether Mr. Gress's precautions in attempting to
prevent underage users from gaining access to Kid Stuff were sufficient
to preclude his liability. "When interpreting a statute, the starting point
is always the language of the statute itself." American Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson,456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). In examining the statute, there are no

references as to what constitutes adequate measures. Moreover, there is
no legislative history describing what the legislature intended when it
used the word adequate. If the legislature had meant to infer that to be
adequate, a measure taken must be fool-proof, strict liability would be
inferred. Had this been the intended standard, the statute would not
have contained language such as "recklessness" or "adequate" at all. The
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very existence such terminology in the statute implies some measure of
fallibility. Mr. Gress's measures, though fallible, are adequate when examined in light of analogous case law.
Looking to established case law, situations where minors have
gained access to "dial-a-porn" phone lines have been addressed and are
analogous. This approach is suggested in An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the FirstAmendment, 39 FED. Comm. L.J. 217,
P.5 (1987):
In 1983, Section 233 [47 U.S.C. §233] was amended to cover "dial-aporn" services. While not intended to apply to bulletin boards, the
amended portions seem applicable to bulletin board operators whose
boards are used by minors. It states
Whoever knowingly(A). . . by means of a telephone, makes (directly or by recording
device) any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to any person under eighteen years of age. . . regardless of
whether the maker of such communication placed the call....
(citing 47 U.S.C. §233(b)(1)(Supp. III 1985)). Electronic Soapbox, supra,
goes on to state that
[c]urrent FCC regulations require the dial-a-porn vendor to allow access
to [their] service only if the caller has a credit card number or vendorsupplied identification code. The code can be supplied only after the
vendor has insured that the applicant is over eighteen. 47 C.F.R.
§64.201 (1985).
These precautions are similar to those used by Mr. Gress to keep
minors from accessing Kid Stuff. Mr. Gress required a driver's license
with proof of age before he issued users their personal identification
number. This PIN had to be entered each time a user tried to gain access
to Kid Stuff. Ms. Domingo was made aware of Mr. Gress's computer program by an underage friend who had gained access to Mr. Gress's Kid
Stuff program by mailing a copy of an adult's driver's license and misrepresenting his identity and age. Ms. Domingo then gained access by
claiming to be that person and using his PIN. Without the ability to
detect exactly who is calling and from where, nothing more could have
been done, as implied by the FCC regulation. As such, Mr. Gress's methods must be viewed as adequate under the Child Pornography Law.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that in a similar statute
forbidding the distribution of pornography to minors, the "statute expressly provided that a defendant must be acquitted on the ground of
'honest mistake' if he proves that he made 'a reasonable bona fide attempt' to ascertain the true age of the minor." Ginsbergv. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968). Similarly, New York has held that
[aibsolute liability without regard to whether the [vendor] was put on
notice that his customer was under age would necessarily restrict and
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curtail the distribution of literature to adults.... In its efforts to protect children, the State is not privileged to so hinder the flow of information and ideas.
People v. Tannenbaum, 220 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1966). By instituting the
access requirements to Kid Stuff, Mr. Gress clearly made a reasonable,
bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of users and also placed them
on notice that they were required to be at least 18 years old to use Kid
Stuff. These standards further demonstrate that Mr. Gress's precautions must be held to be adequate.
In addition to the case law discussed above, a California statute is
instructive in the case at bar. In banning cigarette sales to minors, the
statute recognizes that even the interaction with a salesperson can be
imperfect in stating "[piroof that a defendant. . . demanded, was shown,
and reasonably relied upon evidence of majority shall be [a] defense to
any action brought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 308(a) (West 1994). Similarly,
Mr. Gress put forth an adequate effort to prevent minors from gaining
access to his computer bulletin board. Only with substantial effort and
misrepresentation could minors, such as those in the instant case, gain
access to Kid Stuff. Mr. Gress and other bulletin board operators must
not be held liable for such breaches in their security measures.
The foregoing situations are sufficient to demonstrate that Mr.
Gress's precautions were adequate, especially considering the fact that
very few situations involving dissemination of material via a computer
bulletin board have come to bar. Furthermore, those that have are situations of copyright infringement, where materials have been made available to users of a bulletin board. See Sega v. Maphia, 1994 W.L. 378641
(N.D.Cal. 1993); Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D.Fl. 1993). In
these cases, the disseminated material placed on the bulletin boards for
anyone to take as they pleased. Also, no issue of illegal distributions to
minors or access requirements were addressed, so these cases are distinguishable and not relevant to the case at bar.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the Court of Appeals' grant of the motion for judgment on
the pleadings in favor of Respondents and remand this action to the Melrose County Circuit Court for a trial on the merits of the case.
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EXHIBIT A
MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES

OBSCENITY, PORNOGRAPHY, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

CHAPTER 45

§ III. Child Pornography
$ A.

Child Pornography Defined
1.

$ B.

C.

D.

Any material or performance constitutes child pornography if:
(a) the work appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) the work depicts or describes fornication, sadomasochistic
sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals, whether normal or perverted, actual or simulated and involves a person under the age of
eighteen engaged in such acts; and
(c) the work, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
2. Any person who creates or disseminates child pornography
will be liable for not less than $50,000.00 for each individual
offense.
A person creates Child Pornography when he or she videotapes,
films, photographs, or otherwise uses, depicts, displays or portrays
by means of any visual medium or reproduction, stage play or live
performance, any child whom he or she knows or reasonably
should know to be under the age of eighteen, actually or by simulation engaged in any act or conduct defined in $ A herein, alone
or with other children or adults.
A person disseminates child pornography to a minor when he or
she recklessly or knowingly supplies, distributes, displays or exhibits, or by his or her recklessness causes to be supplied, distributed, displayed or exhibited, to anyone under the age of eighteen
years, any material or performance described in $ A herein. For
purposes of this section, a person is reckless who fails to take adequate means to prevent the dissemination of pornographic materials described herein to anyone under eighteen years of age.
Civil Action by Parent or Guardian
(1) A parent or legal guardian of a minor child used in the creation of child pornography as defined herein may bring a cause
of action for damages on behalf of said child in an amount not
less than $50,000.00 for each individual violation of paragraph
B of this section.
(2) A parent or legal guardian of a minor child to whom child pornography has been disseminated as defined herein may bring
a cause of action for damages on behalf of such minor child in
an amount not less than $50,000.00 for each individual violation of paragraph C of this section.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE MARSHALL STATUTE PROHIBITING THE
CREATION OF OR DISSEMINATION TO MINORS OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
II. WHETHER THE PETITIONER BECAME LIABLE UNDER THE
MARSHALL STATUTE FOR CREATING AND DISSEMINATING
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY WHEN HE WROTE A COMPUTER PROGRAM WHICH GENERATED SEXUAL IMAGES OF CHILDREN,
AND WHEN HE PERMITTED MINORS TO ACCESS THE
PROGRAM?

19951

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....................................
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................
OPINIONS BELOW .............................................
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..............................
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ........................
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................
I. Summary of the Facts .................................
II. Summary of the Proceedings ...........................
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..............................
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..............................
I. THE MARSHALL COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
HELD THAT THE STATE OF MARSHALL MAY
CONSTITUTIONALLY REGULATE COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY WHICH CONTAINS CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY ......................................
A. An Interactive Computer Program Is Not The Type
Of Expression To Which The First Amendment
Affords Full Protection .............................
1. Certain forms of entertainment do not merit
First Amendment protection because the medium
does not communicate information ..............
2. Even if the First Amendment does apply to
computer bulletin boards, these are subject to
greater regulation than other forms of speech
because they are accessed through telephone
lines ...........................................
B. Even If The First Amendment Does Apply To An
Interactive Computer Program, Marshall May
Constitutionally Regulate The Content Of
Petitioner's Kid Stuff Program Because It Contains
Child Pornography .................................
1. Because Marshall has a compelling interest in
protecting children, it may constitutionally
regulate an interactive computer program which
contains child pornography .....................
2. Because the Statute is limited to achieve the
compelling interest of protecting children, it is
not vague or overbroad .........................
II. THE MARSHALL COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
HELD THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE UNDER THE
MARSHALL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTE

538
541
546
546
546
546
546
547
548
549

549

551

552

553

553

555

557

540

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIII

SINCE HE CREATED AND DISSEMINATED CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY ......................................
A. Petitioner's Interactive Computer Program Which
Depicts Children Engaging In Graphic Sexual Acts
Constitutes Child Pornography Under The Laws Of
M arshall ...........................................
1. Petitioner's program appeals solely to the
viewer's prurient interest .......................
2. Petitioner's program depicts sexual practices
involving an actual child under age 18 ..........
3. Petitioner's interactive computer program which
depicts graphic sexual activity by children lacks
serious literary, artistic and political value ......
B. Developing A Computer Program Depicting Children
In Sexually Explicit Scenarios Constitutes Creation
Of Child Pornography In Violation Of The Marshall
Statute ............................................
1. As the author of the Kid Stuff program code,
Petitioner was the creator of the program's child
pornography ....................................
2. The program used an actual photograph of Dede
and depicted her engaging in simulated sexual
acts ............................................
Disseminated Child Pornography To A
Petitioner
C.
Child In Violation Of The Marshall Statute .........
1. As a systems operator on a computer billboard,
Petitioner disseminated child pornography to
children ................................
2. Petitioner recklessly allowed minors access to his
pornographic program ..........................
CON CLUSION ..................................................
APPEND IX A: ..................................................

560

561
562
563
564

564
565
566
567
568
568
569
571

19951

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE(S)

UNTED SrATES SUPREME CouRT CASES

Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) ..................... 554
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ....................... 554
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ..................... 558
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985) ........... 562
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) ............................. 554
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) .............. 554
Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15 (1971) .......................... 551
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) ............. 558
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council 485 U.S. 568 (1988) ......................... 557
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) .................. 553, 562
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ................... 552, 555
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ......................... 551
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) ..... 555
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) .................... 553
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) .......................... 554
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) .............. 551
Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) ........................... 564
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989) ..................... 558
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (.1981) ........... 551, 552
Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15 (1973) ........................ passim
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) ....................... 563
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) .......................... 551
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) ....................... passim
New York v. P.J.Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986) ................ 563
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) .......................... passim
ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) .............. 554
Peel v. Attorney Registration & DisciplinaryComm'n, 496 U.S. 91
(1990) ................................ ..................... 550
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ..................... 555
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) .............. 550, 553
554, 563
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ...................
Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) ......... 553
Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) .................... 552
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) .... 551
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) .................... 557,567
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) ...................... 558
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) ..................... 554
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. NationalAss'n of Letter
Carriers,413 U.S. 548 (1973) ................................. 558

542

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIII

554, 557
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) ......................
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) ....... 558
UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPFA Ls CA sEs .

Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) .................
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992) .......................................................
National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis,811 F.2d 357 (7th
C ir. 1987) ...................................................
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980) .........................
Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. Unit A
June 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Theatres West, Inc. v.
Holmes, 455 U.S. 913 (1982) ................................
S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989) ........
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufrnan, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) .......
United States v. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1963) ........
United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1987), cert.
556,
denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987) ..............................
United States v. Langford, 688 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 959 (1983) .................................
United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984) ......................
United States v. Reedy, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1055 (1988) ................................
United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U .S. 1032 (1986) ........................................
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987) .................................
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1186 (1994) ..................
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982) .......................................................

565
565
550
564

562
566
552
550
559
559
560
559
566
559
559
552

UNITED STATES DISTICT COURT CASES'

America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. New York Dep't of
Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ....................
Rothner v. City of Chicago, 725 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
affd, 929 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991) ...........................
United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ......

552
552
555

1995]

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
STATE COURT CASES:

American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr.
560, 563
33 (Ct. App. 1982) .......................................
569
Arizona v. Jannamon, 819 P.2d 1021 (Ariz. 1991) ................
563
Arizona v. Limpus, 625 P.2d 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) ...........
561
Arizona v. Shepler, 684 P.2d 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) ...........
Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass.
552
1982) .......................................................
Cinema I Video v. Thornburg, 351 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. Ct. App.
557
1986), affd, 358 S.E.2d 383 (N.C. 1987) .....................
Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund,
550
II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199 (Del. 1993) ...........................
562, 563
Griffin v. Florida, 396 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1981) ..................
558
Illinois v. Calvert, 629 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) ...........
Illinois v. Ewen, 551 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal
denied, 555 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854
559
(1990) ......................................................
Illinois v. Geever, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (Ill. 1988), cert. dismissed, 488
561
U .S. 920 (1988) .............................................
Illinois v. Lerch, 480 N.E.2d 1253 (IlM. App. Ct. 1985), cert.
passim
denied, 483 N.E.2d 888 (1985) .............................
561
Illinois v. Spargo, 431 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. 1982) .................
566
Kansas v. Peltier, 819 P.2d 628 (Kan. 1991) ......................
Kaye v. Planning& Zoning Comm'n, 472 A.2d 809 (Conn. Super.
551, 552
Ct. 1983) ................................................
Leach v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn.
1979) ....................................................... 562
Ohio v. Meadows, 503 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio 1986), cert. denied, 480
564
U .S. 936 (1987) .............................................
Payne v. Kentucky, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456
561
U .S. 909 (1982) .............................................
Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communs., Inc., No. 87
565
Civ. 0167 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1992) ..........................
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F.
568
Supp. 432 (W .D. Tex. 1993) .................................
Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. Departmentof Consumer Affairs, 464
N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div. 1983), affd, 464 N.E.2d 988 (N.Y.
1984) ....................................................... 552
Utah v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
560, 566
U .S. 910 (1983) ..........................................
Washington v. Shuck, 661 P.2d 1020 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) ...... 561
CONS TITVT1OA'

U.S.

CONST.

amend. I ......................................... passim

544

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XII

PROCEDURAL RuLEs:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) .............................................

550

FEDERAL STA=TEs-

18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254 (1988 & Supp. 1993) ..................... 556
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 & Supp. 1993) ........................ 559, 566
STATE STATUTES

§ 827.071 (West 1994) .......................... 556
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.0135 (West 1994) .........................
550
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (1994) ...............................
556
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/11-20.1 (Smith-Hurd 1994) ......... passim
MARSHALL REV. STAT. ch. 45, § III,
A-D ..................... passim
FLA. STAT. ANN.

LEGISLATIVE HzsToRY.

H.R. Rep. No. 536, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7, reprintedin 1984

U .S.C.C.A.N . 492 ........................................ 555, 556
S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978
U .S.C.C.A.N . 40 ............................................. 549
S ECONDARY AUTHORITIEs

Peter D. Aufrichtig, Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer
Programsin Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
329 (1982) ..................................................
Charles D. Baker, Offenses Against Minors: Prohibitthe Elec-

553

tronic Furnishingof Obscene Material to Minors, 10 GA. ST.

U .L. REV. 104 (1993) ........................................
Steven C. Bishop, Comment, The Case Against Copyright Protection for ProgrammableLogic Devices, 68 WASH. L. REV. 139
(1993) ......................................................
Computer Porn Problem Grows Digitally in the U.S., Toronto
Star, Mar. 15, 1993, at C5 ..................................
Howard A. Davidson & Gregory A. Loken, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Child Pornographyand Prostitution: Background and Legal
Analysis (1987) .............................................
John C. Dvorak, America, Are You Ready for Simulated Sex and
Virtual Reality?, PC-CoMPUTNG, May 1992, at 78 ...........
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Through the 3-D Looking Glass: Computer
Graphics Comes of Age, TIME, May 1, 1989, at 65 ............
DENNIS FIERY, SECRETS OF A SUPER HACKER (1994) ...............
GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER TELEVISION:

567
552
567
549
549
549
568

THE COMING TRANSFOR-

MATION OF MEDIA AND AMERICAN LIFE (rev.

ed. 1994) ..... 565, 567

1995]

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

David B. Johnson, Why the Possession of Computer-Generated
Child PornographyCan Be Constitutionally Prohibited,4
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 311 (1994) ........................ 549, 557
Edward J. Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for
Obscenity: Serious Literary,Artistic, Political,or Scientific
Value, 11 So. ILL. L. REV. 1159 (1986) .......................
564
Lou Ming, Computer Explores Realm of Senses in Age of

Hyperreality,THE

REUTER LIBRARY REPORT,

July 23, 1992 ....

Christopher M. Mislow, Computer Microcode: Testing the Limits
of Software Copyrightability, 65 B.U. L. REV. 733 (1985) .....
Mark S. Nadel, A Technology TransparentTheory of First
Amendment and Access to Communications Media, 43 FED.
COMM. L.J. 157 (1991) ......................................
Note, The FirstAmendment OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 844 (1970) .............................................
James R. Norman, Lights, Cameras, Chips!, FORBES, Oct. 26,
1992, at 260 ................................................
SHIRLEY O'BRIEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (1983) .................
549,
John Quigley, Child Pornographyand the Right to Privacy, 43
FLA. L. REV. 347 (1991) .....................................
L. Anita Richardson, Obscenity, Erotica and the FirstAmendment, American Bar Association Preview of the United States
Supreme Court Cases, December 31, 1992, at 147 ...........
PHILLIP ROBINSON & NANCY TAMosArTis, THE JoY OF CYBERSEX
(1993) ......................................................
Alan E. Sears, The Legal Case for Restricting Pornography,
Phoenix, Arizona, Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc.
(1994) ......................................................
James M. Strauss, The Second CircuitReview-1987-1988 Term:
Civil Forfeiture: Shouldn't the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 55
BROOKLYN L. REV. 417 (1989) ...............................
There's an X-rated Side to Home Computer, Parents Warned, L.A.
Tnmu s, Dec. 25, 1987, at 47 ..................................
1 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Comm'n on Pornography: Final Report (1986) .................................
549,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Beyond the PornographyComm'n: The
Federal Response (1988) .....................................
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1976) ..................
Kathleen K. Wiegner & Julie Schlax, But Can She Act?, FORBES,
Dec. 10, 1990, at 278 ........................................

550
552

553
558
549

557
556

550
567

549

550
550
557
557

566
549

546

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIII

OPINIONS BELOW
The order of the Melrose County Circuit Court which granted Respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings is unreported. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall which affirms the
circuit court's order is likewise unreported and is set out in the Transcript of Record, (R. at 1-9, Ct. App. Op.).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction is omitted in accordance with section
1020(2) of the 1994 Rules of the John Marshall National Moot Court
Competition.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the determination
of the present action: Marshall Revised Statutes, Chapter 45, Section
III, paragraphs A-D; and 18 U.S.C. sections 2251-2256 (1994). The relevant portions of the statute are set out in Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Dede Domingo, Respondent, is a 15-year-old girl who resides in Marshall with her parents and legal guardians, Douglas and Madeline Domingo, also Respondents. (R. at 1.) On occasion, Dede models children's
clothes for department store catalogues. (R. at 2.)
Petitioner is also a resident of Marshall, where he specializes in
photographing child models. (R. at 1.) In addition, Petitioner is a skilled
computer programmer, and the system operator, or "sysop," of an on-line
bulletin board system (BBS). (R. at 1.) As sysop, Petitioner manages
the operation of the BBS, including all new subscription and access procedures, and also personally creates programs for the BBS. (R. at 2.)
In February 1993, Petitioner hired Dede to model summer clothes
for layouts in summer catalogues. (R. at 2.) Dede's parents signed a release permitting Petitioner to use the photographs of Dede in these catalogues only. (R. at 2.)
A few months later, Petitioner digitally scanned a photograph of
Dede modeling a bikini into his computer database. (R. at 2.) Then, using his programming skills and a computer graphics package, Petitioner
created an interactive sex program entitled Kid Stuff. (R. at 3.) This
program had the capability to depict Dede's image on screen engaged in
simulated sexual scenarios, specifically fellatio, sodomy, masturbation,
cunnilingus and other aspects of sexual intercourse. (R. at 3.) Petitioner
then made his sex program available to international computer network
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(Internet) subscribers via his BBS. (R. at 3.) Petitioner never contacted
Dede or attempted to obtain a release from Dede's parents for the use of
her photograph in the pornographic computer program before releasing
it to the public. See (R. at 2).
In July 1993, Johnny Sawyer, a friend of Dede's, saw Petitioner's sex
program on the BBS and followed Petitioner's basic subscription procedure to obtain a personal identification number (PIN). (R. at 3-4.)
Although Sawyer was a minor, Petitioner issued him a PIN because he
employed no adequate means of verifying the age of the user. (R. at 4.)
On August 30, Johnny logged onto Kid Stuff and was shocked to see the
image of his friend, Dede Domingo, on his screen. (R. at 4.) He immediately notified Dede, who logged onto the program and saw her own image
and the explicit sexual scenarios into which it could be manipulated. (R.
at 4-5.) Dede promptly informed her parents. (R. at 5.)
Mr. and Mrs. Domingo, as parents and next friends of Dede, filed a
complaint against Petitioner in the Melrose County Circuit Court. (R. at
5.) The Domingos alleged that Petitioner had violated the Marshall
Child Pornography Statute chapter 45, section III, paragraphs A-D, of
the Marshall Revised Statutes (hereinafter "the Statute"), and was
civilly liable for the creation and dissemination of child pornography. (R.
at 5-6.) The Domingos claimed damages of not less than $50,000 for the
use of their daughter Dede, a minor, in the creation of child pornography,
and not less than $50,000 for the dissemination of the child pornography
to her. (R. at 6.)
II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On February 10, 1994, the Domingos filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. (R. at 1, 7.) Judge Michelle Hanson of the Melrose
County Circuit Court granted the Domingos' motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and held that, as a matter of law: (1) Petitioner's bulletin
board program constituted offensive material that is constitutionally
proscribed under the Marshall Child Pornography Statute; and (2) Petitioner was civilly liable to the Domingos since he created and disseminated prohibited pornography. (R. at 7.) Judge Hanson ruled that the
Domingos were entitled to statutory damages of $100,000 and costs. (R.
at 7.)
Petitioner fied a timely appeal of Judge Hanson's order to the Court
of Appeals of the State of Marshall, and contended that (1) the Marshall
Child Pornography Statute is unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or, in the alternative, (2) even if
the computer program at issue can be constitutionally proscribed, he is
not personally liable as a creator or disseminator of any prohibited material. (R. at 6, 7.) The Marshall Appellate Court affirmed the circuit
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court's order granting the Domingos' motion for judgment on the pleadings on all counts, and held that the statute is within the First Amendment, that Petitioner's program constitutes prohibited material under
the statute, and that Petitioner is liable for creation and dissemination of
the child pornography. (R. at 8, 9.) It is from this decision that Petitioner appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
The Marshall Court of Appeals correctly held that the State of Marshall may constitutionally regulate computer technology which contains
child pornography. An interactive computer program is not the type of
expression to which the First Amendment affords full protection because
certain forms of entertainment do not merit First Amendment protection. Further, because the program is accessed via telephone lines, it is
subject to greater regulation than other forms of speech. Assuming that
the First Amendment does apply to an interactive computer program,
Marshall may constitutionally regulate an interactive computer program
which contains child pornography because a state has a compelling interest in protecting its children. Moreover, the Statute is suitably limited to
achieve this compelling interest. Thus, the court of appeals was correct
when it held that the Marshall Statute comports with the First
Amendment.
II.
The court of appeals was correct when it held Petitioner liable under
the Statute for creating child pornography and disseminating it to a minor. Petitioner's interactive sex computer program constitutes child pornography under the statute. Because the program depicts a child
engaged in various sex acts sufficiently described by the Statute as prohibited depictions, appeals solely to the viewer's prurient interest, and
lacks serious literary, artistic and political value, the program meets the
statutory definition of child pornography. Petitioner, a systems operator
on a computer bulletin board network, wrote this program and thus "created" child pornography. He then recklessly disseminated this material
to a child when he permitted access to it without implementing adequate
controls to ensure children would not receive the program. Thus, the
district court's order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
Domingos was proper.
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE MARSHALL COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE STATE OF MARSHALL MAY
CONSTITUTIONALLY REGULATE COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY WHICH CONTAINS CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY.

The need to protect children is one of society's highest priorities and
a paramount duty of government. Alan E. Sears, The Legal Case for Restricting Pornography,Phoenix, Arizona, Citizens for Decency Through
Law, Inc. (1994). Sixteen years ago, the United States Congress recognized that child pornography had become a highly organized, multimillion-dollar industry and a serious national problem. See S. Rep. No. 438,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 43. Estimates
range from thousands to hundreds of thousands of children being sexually exploited as a consequence of being used in or exposed to child pornography. Howard A. Davidson & Gregory A. Loken, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Child Pornography and Prostitution: Background and Legal
Analysis at v (1987);

SHIRLEY O'BRIEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

at vii (1983).

Historically, the focus of the inquiry into child pornography has been
the process by which children became subjects of pornographic material.
See 1 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: Final Report § 7.1 (1986). The Justice Department Commission on
Pornography, writing in 1986, stated that "pornography necessarily includes the sexual abuse of a real child." Id. In 1986, however, the Commission's understanding of what was "necessary" to create child
pornography was limited to the then-existing methods of producing child
pornography.
Today, technological advances allow computer users to achieve
photo-realistic quality by scanning photographs into digital form, and
then using a graphics program to manipulate the scanned images. See
James R. Norman, Lights, Cameras, Chips!, FORBES, Oct. 26, 1992, at
260, 261; Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Through the 3-D Looking Glass: Computer Graphics Comes of Age, TIME, May 1, 1989, at 65. This technology
has been used to create a new form of pornography: interactive computer images combining fixed variables selected by the user. Id. (citing
John C. Dvorak, America, Are You Ready for Simulated Sex and Virtual
Reality?, PC-COMPUTING, May 1992, at 78). Experts agree that within 20
years, a viewer will be unable to tell the difference between a real and a

computer-generated actor. Kathleen K. Wiegner & Julie Schlax, But
Can She Act?, FORBES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 278.
Computer technology has advanced at a faster pace than the laws
governing it. David B. Johnson, Why the Possession of Computer-Generated Child PornographyCan Be Constitutionally Prohibited,4 ALB. L.J.
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SC. & TECH. 311 (1994); There's an X-rated Side to Home Computer,Par-

ents Warned, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1987, at 47. Computer technology is
growing so fast that society is unprepared to deal with the questions it
will pose for human privacy. Lou Ming, Computer Explores Realm of
Senses in Age of Hyperreality, THE

REUTER

LmRARY

REPORT,

July 23,

1992.
Currently, all 50 states and the United States have passed legislation targeted to eradicating child pornography. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 720, § 5/11-20.1 (Smith-Hurd 1994) (listing comparative child pornography laws of 48 states). Marshall has also enacted such a statute. See
Appendix A. The constitutionality of including computer-generated
images among the prohibited materials in child pornography statutes is
a unique question of law. This Court should guard against the harms
that threaten thousands of children if these statutes are not interpreted
to protect them. 1
In this case, the Domingos obtained a judgment on the pleadings
against Petitioner after he violated the Statute by creating and disseminating a pornographic interactive computer program involving their 15year-old daughter, Dede. (R. at 3.) The Marshall Rules of Procedure provide for judgment on the pleadings. (R. at 1.) Since the state rule is
modeled after the federal rule, the state court should look to federal law
in construing the rule. See Desert Equities,Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1204 (Del. 1993). On a plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, the question is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as matter of law on the facts admitted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c); see United States v. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d 351, 35253 (3d Cir. 1963); see also National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis,
811 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1987). The court considers all undenied facts alleged in the complaint and assumes as true all material allegations of
fact in the answer. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d at 352.
Petitioner asserts that his program is protected by the First Amendment. (R. at 6.) The United States Supreme Court has held that First
Amendment protection is a question of law over which a court should
exercise de novo review. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Commission, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990).2
1. Florida is the only state to date to specifically proscribe "Computer Pornography."
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.0135 (West 1994).
2. Because Petitioner does not assert that the Statute is outside any constitutional
provision other than the First Amendment, this Court need not consider any other theory.
See R.AV. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2619 (1992) (concurring opinion); see also L. Anita
Richardson, Obscenity, Erotica and the First Amendment, American Bar Association Preview of the United States Supreme Court Cases, December 31, 1992, at 147 (discussing
Eighth Amendment challenge); James M. Strauss, The Second CircuitReview-1987-1988
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The trial court was correct when it granted the Domingos' motion for
judgment on the pleadings because Petitioner's interactive sex program
is proscribed by the Statute. Marshall may constitutionally regulate
child pornography because such material is not the type of "expression"
to which the First Amendment extends full protection. Further, the context of the program-child pornography-does not merit First Amendment protection. Moreover, The Statute is suitably limited to achieve
the State's compelling interest of protecting children. For these reasons,
the Domingos respectfully request that this Court affirm the decisions of
the courts below and hold that the Statute is within the First
Amendment.
A.

AN INTERAcTIvE COMPUTER PROGRAM Is NOT THE TYPE OF
EXPRESSION

To WHICH THE FIRST AMENDMENT AFFORDS FULL

PROTECTION.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that Congress shall make no law which abridges the freedom of speech,
or of the press. U.S. Const. amend. I; see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925). The right to express oneself freely is a far-reaching but
limited right. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
A threshold question in evaluating the extent of First Amendment
protection available to certain conduct is whether one has engaged in
speech or expression at all. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 505 (1981); Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15, 15-26 (1971). If there
has been no expression of ideas or communication, the First Amendment
does not afford protection to the conduct. Cohen, 453 U.S. at 505.
For First Amendment purposes, each medium must be assessed by
standards specifically suited to it, for each medium presents its own
problems. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557
(1975). The Supreme Court has not articulated any precise test for determining whether a given medium, such as entertainment, is "expression." Kaye v. Planning& Zoning Commission, 472 A.2d 809, 810 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1983). The primary inquiry is whether the medium informs
as well as entertains. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501 (1952) (holding that movies are protected speech as a "significant
medium for the communication of ideas").
In this case, Petitioner may not successfully invoke the First
Amendment because his interactive computer program is not sufficiently
expressive. Further, even if the program is sufficiently expressive to
merit First Amendment protection, it may be heavily regulated as "common carrier" media. Thus, Marshall may constitutionally regulate this
Term: Civil Forfeiture: Shouldn't the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 55 BRooxLYN L. REv. 417

(1989) (addressing civil-criminal dichotomy in Fourth and Fifth Amendment context).
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type of speech. For these reasons, Respondents request that this Court
affirm the judgments of the courts below, and hold that the Statute is
within the First Amendment.
1.

CERTAIN FORMS OF ENTERTAINMENT DO NOT MERIT FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION BECAUSE THE MEDIUM DOES NOT
COMMUNICATE INFORMATION.

"Entertainment," as well as political and ideological speech, may be
protected expression. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
To gain protected status, the entertainment must be designed to communicate some idea or information. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,453 U.S.
490, 505 (1981); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Courts across the country have consistently held that computer programs in the form of video games are not sufficiently expressive to be
characterized as a form of speech which implicates the free speech provisions of the Constitution. See America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v.
New York Dep't of Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Caswell v.
Licensing Commission for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1982);
Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 464 N.Y.S.2d
132 (App. Div.), affd, 464 N.E.2d 988 (N.Y. 1984); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 725 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 929 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991);
Kaye v. Planning& Zoning Commission, 472 A.2d 809 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1983).
The basis for these holdings is that a video game is pure entertainment and not meant to inform. America's Best, 536 F. Supp. at 174.
Thus, the games are not fairly characterized as a form of speech which
implicates First Amendment protection. Id.; see Stern Elecs., Inc. v.
Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982). In fact, a video game is nothing more than a computer program with a rigid structure and a dedicated purpose of entertainment. See Christopher M. Mislow, Computer
Microcode: Testing the Limits of Software Copyrightability, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 733, 736 (1985). See also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc.,
685 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d
852, 854 (2d Cir. 1982).
Petitioner's program is essentially a video game, in substance and in
technology. Both provide the user with pure entertainment rather than
information; both execute a fixed set of rigid commands geared toward a
dedicated purpose. See Steven C. Bishop, Comment, The Case Against
Copyright Protectionfor ProgrammableLogic Devices, 68 WASH. L. REV.
139, 141 (1993).
Petitioner created a de facto child pornography video game which
allows users to select children's images on a computer screen and manip-
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ulate them in various sexual acts. (R. at 3.) There is no evidence in the
record which indicates that Kid Stuff includes any information or ideas.
Like any typical video game, it is intended solely for the user's
entertainment.
Because Kid Stuff is essentially a video game, it is not entitled to
First Amendment protection. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
2.

EVEN

IF THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES APPLY TO COMPUTER BULLETIN

BOARDS, THESE ARE SUBJECT TO GREATER REGULATION THAN
OTHER FORMS OF SPEECH BECAUSE THEY ARE ACCESSED
THROUGH TELEPHONE LINES.

Broadcasted speech is not entitled to the same First Amendment
protection as other forms of speech. See FCC v. PacificaFound., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (permitting regulation of radio broadcasts); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (allowing regulation of mail). These
types of speech are referred to as "common carrier" media. Mark S.
Nadel, A Technology TransparentTheory of FirstAmendment and Access
to Communications Media, 43 FED. Comm. L.J. 157, 158 (1991).
The United States Supreme Court has considered whether the Federal Communications Commission could ban obscene and indecent "diala-porn" telephone messages. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115 (1989); accord R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545
(1992). The Court upheld the ban on obscene speech because uch expression is excepted from First Amendment protection. Sable, 492 U.S.
at 125. Child pornography, like obscenity, is without constitutional protection. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). Therefore,
banning such material from telephone lines is not in violation of the
First Amendment.
Like the dial-a-porn considered in Sable, computer users access bulletin boards like Internet over telephone lines via a device called a
modem. Peter D. Aufrichtig, Note, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329, 337
(1982). Therefore, the lower court was correct when it held that restricting the dissemination of Petitioner's BBS program is constitutional.
B.

EVEN IF THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES APPLY

To AN

INTERACTIVE

COMPUTER PROGRAM, MARSHALL MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY

REGULATE THE CONTENT OF PETITIONER'S KID STUFF
PROGRAM BECAUSE IT CONTAINS CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY.

Even if Petitioner's program is sufficiently expressive to invoke First
Amendment protections, the Statute passes constitutional muster under
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the First Amendment. A statute regulating the content of speech will
survive judicial review if it furthers a compelling governmental interest
by narrowly drawn means necessary to achieve the end. See, e.g.,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 465 (1980).
This free speech guarantee is not, however, absolute. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited categories of speech which states
may prevent and punish without raising a constitutional problem since
the communication of ideas is not involved. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (fighting words); see Beauharnaisv.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1952) (libelous speech); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969) (incitement to riot); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762
(1982) (child pornography).
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the argument that obscene speech deserves First Amendment protection. See Roth, 354 U.S.
at 486; Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973); ParisAdult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973). Both the states and the federal government have long regulated the trade in sexually explicit materials under
the label of "obscenity" because of its slight social value. Roth, 354 U.S.
at 486; see United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971) (holding that
18 U.S.C. § 1461 is constitutional as applied to the distribution of obscene materials). The basis for obscenity regulation is the theory that
states have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that commerce in obscene material has a tendency to injure the community as a
whole. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
The Supreme Court has recognized that requiring child pornography
to meet the same standard as obscenity does not further the compelling
interest in prosecuting those who promote sexual exploitation of children. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. Thus, a state may regulate child pornography without offending the First Amendment as long as the statute is
suitably limited in scope to achieving the state's objective. Id. at 773.
Because Petitioner's program is child pornography and merits no First
Amendment protection, Marshall may constitutionally regulate it. Further, the Statute is suitably limited to achieve Marshall's compelling interest in prohibiting child exploitation. As such, the Statute is within
the First Amendment. This Court should therefore affirm the decision of
the court of appeals.
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BECAUSE MARSHALL HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN PROTECTING
CHILDREN, IT MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY REGULATE AN
INTERACTIVE COMPUTER PROGRAM WHICH CONTAINS CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY.

A state's interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor is compelling." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756; Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). Legislation
which protects children receives wide judicial latitude when juxtaposed
against the interests protected by the Bill of Rights. United States v.
Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421, 1428 (C.D. Cal. 1987). Thus, the Supreme
Court has upheld legislation which protects the well-being of youth even
when the laws affect constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., Ferber,
458 U.S. at 756; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding a statute prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature on the
street despite effect on First Amendment activity); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (upholding a New York law protecting children from exposure to non-obscene literature).
In fulfilling their duty to protect children, the United States
Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that child pornography,
like obscenity, does not deserve First Amendment protection. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. See also H.R. Rep. No. 536, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492. However, child pornography is distinguished from obscenity because courts must focus on the harm suffered by the child victim, rather than on the effects of the material on the
audience. Ferber,458 U.S. at 757. In contrast to the Miller v. California
obscenity standard, the trier of fact in a child pornography case need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; the sexual conduct portrayed need not be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole. Id. at 764. In other words, child pornography need not meet the
Miller definition of obscenity in order to be constitutionally regulated.
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 (articulating obscenity standard).
The Ferber Court held that the states are entitled to great leeway in
the regulation of child pornography. 458 U.S. at 756. The Court identified five factors which justify this leeway: (1) a state's interest in safeguarding the well-being of minors is "compelling"; (2) distribution of
child pornography is intrinsically related to sexual abuse of children; (3)
the distribution of child pornography provides an economic motive for its
production; (4) the value of permitting child pornography is exceedingly
modest, if not de minimis; (5) classifying child pornography as outside
the protection of the First Amendment is compatible with precedent. Id.
at 356-64.
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In response to Ferber, Congress amended the Federal Child Pornography Statute to eliminate the requirement that the visual depiction of
the minor engaged in sexual conduct be obscene. H.R. Rep. No. 536, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492-493; see 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254 (1988 & Supp. 1993). Many states followed suit in
their child pornography statutes. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/
11-20.1 (Smith-Hurd 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 827.071 (West 1994). Accordingly, child pornography has
become obscene per se.
Applying Ferber,courts have held that several different types of material constitute "child pornography" and are thus subject to governmental regulation. In Illinois v. Lerch, the court found "child pornography"
where the defendant photographed his six-year-old child in the nude
with her pubic area exposed. 480 N.E.2d 1253 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 483 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 1985). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit found
"child pornography" where the defendant videotaped a 16-year-old girl
wearing only a see-through scarf and focused on her genitals. United
States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
922 (1987).
In this case, Kid Stuff is child pornography because it uses the photographs of real children to depict simulated sexual scenarios. (R. at 3.)
The children's faces and bodies can be combined with computer-generated images of body parts to show the child engaged in fellatio, sodomy,
masturbation, cunnilingus, or foreplay and intercourse. (R. at 3.) In particular, a picture of 16-year-old Dede Domingo was scanned into this interactive sex program and released into a database accessible to the
public. (R. at 2-3.)
Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court intended to draw a distinction between images that were created by using an actual child actor
and those that were not when it stated that "depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performances or
... visual reproduction of live performances, retain First Amendment
protection." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765; see John Quigley, Child Pornography and the Right to Privacy, 43 FLA. L. REV. 347, 392 (1991).
This argument should fail. Although the FerberCourt did rely heavily on the harm associated with actual participation of children in sexual
acts, its rationale was not limited to physical abuse. The Court recognized that a major component of child pornography is the extensive emotional harm to the child. 458 U.S. at 759 n.10. Specifically, when a
child's image is used in pornography, it: (1) arouses feelings that the
child does not have the experience with which to cope; (2) degrades the
child's self-image; (3) suggests that the child wanted to engage in the
conduct and, therefore, is willing to participate in real sexual experiences; (4) makes the child vulnerable to sexual dependency; (5) inhibits

1995]

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

healthy sexual functioning in later life; (6) invades the child's privacy;
and (7) distorts the child's sense of what is appropriate behavior. SHIRLEY O'BRIEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY at xi-xii (1983). See generally U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Beyond the PornographyCommission: The Federal Response (1988).
Prohibiting computer-generated child pornography directly advances Marshall's interest. See David B. Johnson, Why the Possession of
Computer-Generated Child Pornography Can Be Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 311 (1982). Regulation of computergenerated child pornography will prevent pedophiles from using these
images to seduce children into sexual activity. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 111 (1990); 1 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Commission
on Pornography:FinalReport 646, 649-50 (1986). In addition, child pornography laws will be rendered ineffective if the market is flooded with
computer-generated child pornography; as the technology becomes more
advanced, computer pornographic images will become indistinguishable
from real children's photographs. See Johnson, supra, at 311. As such,
law enforcement efforts against this sexual abuse of children will become
nearly impossible. Id. Although Dede was not physically abused, she
suffered significant harm. She and at least one of her friends saw her
portrayed in graphic sexual acts. (R. at 4.) These sexual scenarios could
be accessed by her other friends at school as well as by strangers. Therefore, Dede has been exposed to the betrayal and emotional harm associated with child pornography. For these reasons, this Court should affirm
the judgments of the courts below.
2.

BECAUSE THE STATUTE IS LIMITED TO ACHIEVE THE COMPELLING
INTEREST OF PROTECTING CHILDREN, IT IS NOT VAGUE OR
OVERBROAD.

Statutes which restrict or burden free speech must be narrowly
drawn. Cinema I Video v. Thornburg, 351 S.E.2d 305, 313 (N.C. Ct.
App.), affd, 358 S.E.2d 383 (N.C. 1989); see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
at 274. Courts, however, must construe a statute to avoid constitutional
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
To convey an adequate warning under the Constitution, a statute
need not satisfy "impossible standards" of precision; rather, the language
must convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices. United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). In order to overcome First Amendment
protection, the Ferber Court required that child pornography statutes
"adequately define" the conduct to be prohibited. 458 U.S. at 764. Fur-
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ther, the "sexual conduct" proscribed must also be suitably limited and
described. Id. In other words, the statute must comply with the related
doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.
OVE.RBREADTH

The overbreadth doctrine allows a person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied to challenge it on the ground that it may be
unconstitutional when applied to situations not before the Court. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989); see United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). The overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine"
and should be employed "only as a last resort." Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
Before a statute will be invalidated on its face, the overbreadth involved must be "real" and "substantial." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615;
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976). Thus,
even if there are some situations in which a statute would infringe on the
First Amendment, it is inappropriate to invalidate a statute if it covers a
whole range of constitutionally proscribable conduct. United States Civil
Serv. Commission v. NationalAss'n of Letter Carriers,413 U.S. 548, 58081 (1973); see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844, 860-61 (1970) (observing that few laws are devoid of
potential for unconstitutionality in some application).
A statute is not overbroad if it provides a broad range of permissible
exceptions to the prohibited speech. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
112 (1990). In Osborne, the statute's definition of "nudity" was limited
by the Court to avoid penalizing persons for possessing innocuous photographs of naked children. Id. As a result, the Court held that the Ohio
statute survived overbreadth scrutiny. Id. at 114. Similarly, a statute
which lists the forbidden acts with precision and sufficiently describes a
category of material which is not entitled to First Amendment protection
is not overbroad. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773 (holding N.Y. PENAL LAW art.
63 (McKinney 1980) constitutional). The Marshall Statute lists with precision the material and activities prohibited. Therefore, the Statute survives overbreadth scrutiny.
VAG UENSS

A law is unconstitutionally vague if persons of common intelligence
must guess at its meaning or differ as to its application. Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Illinois v. Calvert, 629
N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Conversely, a statute is not vague
if it is explicit enough to serve as a guide to those who must comply with
it. Calvert, 629 N.E.2d at 1159.
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In United States v. Freeman, the defendant violated the Federal
Child Protection Act when he videotaped a nude 16-year-old girl, focusing on her genitals. 808 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir.) (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252 (1988 & Supp. 1993)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987). The court
rejected the defendant's argument that the phrase "lascivious exhibition
of the genitals" was unconstitutionally vague. Id.; see United States v.
Langford, 688 F.2d 1088, 1090 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 959
(1983). The court stated: "We fail to see how men of reasonable intelligence, guided by common understanding and practices, would believe
that such conduct is permissible." Freeman, 808 F.2d at 1292; accord
United States v. Reedy, 845 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1055 (1988).
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act was not unconstitutional for including
"actual or simulated bestiality and sadistic or masochistic abuse."
United States v.X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.
1992). 3 The court also upheld the term "lascivious"because it is a common sense term whose constitutionality was specifically upheld in Miller
v. Californiaand in Ferber. Id.; United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
State child pornography statutes which suitably limit and describe
the category of "sexual conduct" proscribed have been upheld. In Ferber,
the New York child pornography statute limited the prohibited sexual
conduct to "actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd
exhibition of the genitals." 458 U.S. at 751. Similarly, the Illinois child
pornography statute described the prohibited conduct as actual or simulated sexual intercourse; masturbation; lewd fondling; any act of excretion or urination within a sexual context; sadistic, masochistic, or
sadomasochistic abuse in any sexual context; or any lewd exhibition of
the unclothed genitals, pubic area or buttocks. See Illinois v. Ewen, 551
N.E.2d 426, 430 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 379 (Ill.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 854 (1990) (construing ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 720, § 5/1120.1 (Smith-Hurd 1994)). Such description was held to be sufficient to
give notice of the prohibited material, and thereby avoid being struck for
vagueness. Id.
The Statute is not overbroad or vague because it suitably limits the
unlawful conduct. The Statute defines child pornography as "(1) [any
material or performance [in which]... (b) the work depicts or describes
fornication, sadomasochistic sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of the genitals, whether normal or perverted,
3. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in this case on the
issue of scienter. See 114 S. Ct. 1186 (1994).
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actual or simulated, and involves a Lerson under the age of eighteen
...

."

See Appendix A. The list of proscribed sexual conduct by a minor

in part (1)(b) of the definition closely mirrors that of the child pornography statutes held constitutional above. Thus, the Statute's regulation of
material which depicts these activities and involves a person under the
age of 18 is not a violation of the First Amendment.
In fact, the Statute provides even more First Amendment protection
than Ferbermandates because it requires that child pornography satisfy
aspects of the more stringent obscenity standard. See Ferber,458 U.S. at
764. An Illinois child pornography statute, which, like the Marshall
Statute, included the three-part obscenity test in its definition of child
pornography, was upheld as constitutional. See Illinois v. Lerch, 480
N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 483 N.E.2d 888 (Inl.
1985). 4 Similarly, in American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior Court,

the court addressed a California child pornography statute and held that
the term "prurient interest" provided sufficient notice of the type of material proscribed. 181 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Statute, like the California and Illinois statutes, incorporates
parts of the Miller obscenity standard in its definition of child pornography. See Appendix A. As a result, Marshall's child pornography statute
protects an individual's First Amendment rights to a greater extent than
Ferber requires and to a greater extent than child pornography statutes
which, without such obscenity requirements, have been held constitutional. For these reasons, this Court should find Marshall's statute constitutional, and affirm the courts below.
II. THE MARSHALL COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD
THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE UNDER THE MARSHALL
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTE SINCE HE
CREATED AND DISSEMINATED CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY.
Petitioner maintains that even if his sexually graphic computer program can be constitutionally proscribed, he is not liable under the Statute. (R. at 7.) Petitioner's claim is a matter of statutory construction;
therefore, this Court should review de novo the questions of law in this
case. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
Words used in a statute are symbols of communication and are not
invested with the quality of a scientific formula. See Utah v. Jordan,665
P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 910 (1983). It is
enough that they can be construed with reasonable certainty. Id. Where
4. The current Illinois child pornography statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/11-20.1
(Smith-Hurd 1994), contains no requirement that the material proscribed be "obscene."
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the language used in a child pornography statute is modified by other
qualifying purposes, these qualifiers will be used to construe the statute
narrowly so as to achieve its purpose. Id. at 1284. See Payne v. Kentucky, 623 S.W.2d 867, 870-71 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909
(1982).
The Illinois Supreme Court construed a child pornography statute
strikingly similar to the one before this Court. See Illinois v. Geever, 522
N.E.2d 1200, 1205 (Ill.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 920 (1988). The Geever
court stated that a court is to consider a statute in its entirety and give
effect to the legislature's intent in construing a statute. Id. When that
legislative purpose is indicated from the context of the statute as a
whole, a defendant may not isolate a word from its context in order to
give it a new meaning. See, e.g., Arizona v. Shepler, 684 P.2d 924, 925-26
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that statute's use of plural did not prevent
conviction resulting from child pornography involving one minor).
The purpose of the Statute is clear on its face: to prevent sexual
abuse and exploitation of children, and effectively eliminate the resulting
physical and psychological harms, by destroying the market for child
pornography. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990). The means
for achieving this goal are set forth in the Statute by prohibiting the creation of child pornography and by prohibiting its distribution to minors.
See Appendix A; see also Geever, 522 N.E.2d at 1206; Illinois v. Spargo,
431 N.E.2d 27, 31-32 (Ill. App. 1982); Illinois v. Lerch, 480 N.E.2d 1253,
1259 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 483 N.E.2d 888 (1985).
The Marshall Legislature provided a broad means for eliminating
the harms to children attributable to such sexual depictions, regardless
of the medium used. Petitioner's action in creating images of Dede and
other children engaged in sexual activity via an interactive computer
program constitutes the creation of child pornography. His action in
placing these images on a computer bulletin board easily accessed by
children constitutes dissemination of child pornography under the Statute. Therefore, Petitioner's actions were the type that the Marshall Legislature intended to punish. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the
lower court's decision that Petitioner is liable under the Statute.

A.

PETITIONER'S INTERACTIVE COMPUTER PROGRAM WHICH DEPICTS
CHILDREN ENGAGING IN GRAPHIC SEXUAL ACTS CONSTITUTES

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER THE LAws OF MARSHALL.
The Statute initially requires the material in question to meet the
Statute's definition of child pornography. (R. at 5.) This requirement
comports with the Supreme Court's holding in New York v. Ferber which
held that states could enact statutes prohibiting child pornography. 458
U.S. at 764; see, e.g., Washington v. Shuck, 661 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Wash.
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Ct. App. 1983) (affirming a conviction under a Washington statute defining prohibited conduct as depiction of children in actual or simulated
sexually explicit activity, and specifically listing masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, and lewd exhibition of the genitals); Griffin v. Florida,
396 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1981) (upholding statutory definition of child pornography to include both actual and simulated depictions).
The Statute sets out the prohibited material, described with sufficient precision to give adequate notice as Ferber requires. See Ferber,
458 U.S. at 764-65; Appendix A. This definition involves a three-pronged
test for determining whether material constitutes child pornography.
See Appendix A. First, the material must appeal solely to the viewer's
prurient interest. Id. Next, the material must depict sexual practices
involving a child under the age of 18. Id. Last, the material must lack
serious literary, artistic, and political value. Id.
Because Petitioner's interactive computer program permits the user
to select from a variety of actual children's pictures, and then to manipulate those images so that the selected child engages in various sex acts,
the Kid Stuff program meets the statutory definition. Therefore, the
court below was correct when it held that the interactive computer program constitutes child pornography.
1.

PETITIONER'S PROGRAM APPEALS SOLELY TO THE VIEWER'S PRURIENT
INTEREST.

The Supreme Court held that "prurient appeal" is one element of
obscenity. FCC v. PacificaFound., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978). The text of
the Statute indicates that the legislature chose to require this single element, but not the entire set of elements required for a finding of obscenity. Compare Appendix A with Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15, 23-24
(1973).
While the Ferber Court indicated that, unlike obscenity, the definition of child pornography did not require an appeal to the prurient interest as an element, the states are not precluded from including this
component in their statutory definitions of child pornography. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. Inclusion of the phrase does not indicate that the
legislature intended that material meet the test for obscenity; rather, it
merely serves to increase protection of defendants in child pornography
cases. See id.
A statute need not define "prurient." See Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v.
Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1026 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981), cert. denied sub
nom. Theatres West, Inc. v. Holmes, 455 U.S. 913 (1982); Leach v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738, 749-50 (Tenn. 1979). Instead, "prurient" commonly means that which appeals to the shameful or
morbid interest in sex. See Brockett v.Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
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491, 491 (1985); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957). In New
York v. P.J.Video, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court focused on the
conduct depicted (cunnilingus, fellatio, intercourse, and ejaculation on
the face) and concluded that the material was prurient. 475 U.S. 868,
878-79 (1986).
The Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of "prurient" in Mishkin
v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). The petitioner in Mishkin argued
that his sexually explicit material did not meet the definition of "prurient" because only a limited group of individuals would become aroused
by the material. Id. at 508. The Court stated that material has prurient
appeal if the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest in sex of the members of its intended recipient
group. Id. at 508-09; see Illinois v. Lerch, 480 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (1985);
American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Ct.
App. 1982).
Like the material in Mishkin and P.J. Video, Petitioner's program is
targeted at a very limited group who are aroused by sex with children.
The program provides no information; instead, the viewer may manipulate images of children to engage in sodomy, masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, and other sexual acts. (R. at 3, 4.) As such, the depictions are
prurient, and the lower court was correct when it held these depictions to
be child pornography. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the
courts below.
2.

PETITIONER'S PROGRAM DEPICTS SEXUAL PRACTICES INVOLVING AN
ACTUAL CHILD UNDER AGE

18.

The Statute specifies that to constitute child pornography, the prohibited material must depict or describe -fornication, sadomasochistic
sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition of the
genitals, whether normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and that the
material must involve a person under the age of 18 engaged in such acts.
See Appendix A. The depictions for which Petitioner was found liable
satisfy this element of the definition.
Petitioner admitted that his sex program permitted the user to manipulate Dede Domingo's image in sexually graphic scenarios. (R. at 3,
6.) Any person of ordinary intelligence would readily conclude that the
sexual depictions constitute prohibited conduct under the plain meaning
of the Statute. See Arizona v. Limpus, 625 P.2d 960, 964 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981); Griffin v. Florida, 396 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1981).
It is undisputed that Dede Domingo was under age 18 when Petitioner scanned her photograph into his pornographic program. (R. at 23.) Furthermore, Petitioner employed her just three months before as a
child model and knew that she was a minor because her parents signed
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the contract permitting the use of Dede's photographs. (R. at 2.) For
these reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's determination
that the sex program's depictions met this element of the Statute's definition of child pornography.
3.

PETITIONER'S INTERACTIVE COMPUTER PROGRAM WHICH DEPICTS
GRAPHIC SEXUAL ACTIVITY BY CHILDREN LACKS SERIOUS
LITERARY, ARTISTIC AND POLITICAL VALUE.

The Statute also inquires into whether the material lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. See Appendix A. Although
not required, the inclusion of this element does not invalidate the Statute as a permissible restriction on child pornography or transform the
Statute into one that must meet the obscenity test. See, e.g., Ohio v.
Meadows, 503 N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ohio), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 936 (1986).
A state's purpose in including this element is to exempt from liability
uses having a bona fide artistic, medical, educational, judicial, or other
proper purpose. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 114 nn.9, 11.
There is a paucity of discussion by both federal and state courts of
the meaning of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Edward J. Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity:
Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or Scientific Value, 11 So. ILL. L.
REV. 1159, 1165 (1986). The Supreme Court has focused on the creator's
intent to produce a serious work as a whole; as long as an individual has
"something to say," he ought to be allowed to say it as long as his intent
is sincere. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972); see also Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1362-63 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980). For example, in Illinois v. Lerch, the
defendant's contention that photographs depicting a mother lying on top
of her six-year-old had artistic merit was rejected. 480 N.E.2d 1253,
1260 (1985).
In this case, Petitioner has neither asserted nor demonstrated that
his graphic sexual portrayals of Dede Domingo has any serious value.
Any such value, if it exists at all, is certainly negligible. Thus, Petitioner's program easily meets prong three of the Statute's definition. For
these reasons, this Court should affirm the order granting the Domingos'
judgment on the pleadings.
B.

DEVELOPING A COMPUTER PROGRAM DEPICTING CHILDREN
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT SCENARIOS CONSTITUTES CREATION OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN VIOLATION OF THE MARSHALL

IN

STATUTE.

In the last decade, technology has changed dramatically. The
number of personal computers in offices rose more than twenty fold in
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just the 11 years from 1981 to 1992. George Gilder, LIFE AFTER TELEVILIFE 45
(rev. ed. 1994). Use in homes rose more than one-hundredfold. Id. Between 1989 and 1993, the portion connected to networks rose from under
10 percent to over 60 percent. Id. Likewise, the digital imaging capability of computers has become highly sophisticated, and will continue to
improve. Because these images are practically indistinguishable from
real films and photographs, the harms to children like Dede have not
changed from those discussed over a decade ago in Ferber. See 458 U.S.
at 747, 759. For this reason, the Marshall Legislature enacted a statute
broad enough to encompass all pornographic depictions involving children, including computer graphics. See Appendix B.
Petitioner created a computer program for the sole purpose of animating images of real children engaged in sexual acts and depicted Dede
Domingo engaged in simulated sexual acts. Therefore, Petitioner's development of the interactive sex program constitutes creation of prohibited material under the Statute. For these reasons, this Court should
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
SION: THE COMING TRANSFORMATION OF MEDIA AND AMERICAN

1.

As

THE AUTHOR OF THE KID STUFF PROGRAM CODE, PETITIONER WAS
THE CREATOR OF THE PROGRAM'S CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.

Petitioner does not dispute that Internet subscribers across the
country are able to access visual images of Dede Domingo engaged in
masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, and sodomy. (R. at 3, 6.) He asserts
that he did not create child pornography because, although he created
the computer codes which produced the sexual animations, he did not
personally place the image of Dede Domingo's head upon the sexually
engaged bodies. (R. at 7.) Petitioner argues that because his program is
an interactive one, it is the user who determines what shall be depicted
in the images, and that, therefore, it is the program user who creates
pornography, not Petitioner. (R. at 7.)
Courts have rejected this overly rigid interpretation of the term "create" when analyzing the development of computer programs. The elements of a computer program, such as the source and object code, are
"authored" by the person who compiles them into a specific program. See
Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that "creation" of
a computer program extends to the non-literal elements of the program).
Cases resolving the issue of computer program "creation" for the
purpose of copyright are analogous here. In Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communs., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 0167 (S.D.N.Y. June 29,
1992), the district court examined the issue of creation of interactive
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computer programs in a copyright context. Id. The court held that the
person who writes the code of an interactive computer program is the
creator of that program for the purpose of a copyright. Id. at 16-17.
While the court did not address the issue of whether users could be considered "creators," the court found that persons who contribute ideas and
design to the program, but do not contribute to the writing of the actual
code, are not "creators." Id. at 16-17; see also S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that computer programmer is the sole author of the program he creates).
Petitioner's argument is also comparable to that of the defendant in
United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1032 (1986). Smith argued that his unprocessed, undeveloped film of unclothed girls did not constitute a "visual depiction" within the meaning of
the statute under which he was charged. Id. at 846; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a) (1988 and Supp. 1993). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the issue was not whether the film actually reached
the point of "visual depiction," but whether the defendant intended to
produce such visual depictions. Smith, 795 F.2d at 847; see Kansas v.
Peltier, 819 P.2d 628, 643 (Kan. 1991).
The fact that Petitioner's "unprocessed, undeveloped" computer binary codes, while still in his control, may not reach the point of a "visual
depiction" of a sexually engaged child does not relieve him of liability
under the Statute. Petitioner, like the defendant in Smith, admits that
the purpose of these codes is to produce pornographic images of children
via graphic sexual animations. See (R. at 2-3). As such, Petitioner created child pornography. For these reasons, this Court should uphold Petitioner's liability under the Statute.
2.

THE PROGRAM USED AN ACTUAL PHOTOGRAPH OF DEDE AND DEPICTED
HER ENGAGING IN SIMULATED SEXUAL ACTS.

Petitioner challenges his liability as a creator of child pornography
since he created pornographic digital computer images instead of
photographing a child actually engaged in sexual conduct. (R. at 7.)
The Statute specifically imposes liability for creation of child pornography even when the conduct is "simulated." See Appendix A. The
Supreme Court of Utah has addressed the meaning of "simulated" sexual
conduct as it relates to child pornography. Utah v. Jordan, 665 P.2d
1280, 1285-86 (Utah), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 910 (1983). The Jordan
court found that under the common definition of the word, "simulated"
means "to assume the outward qualities or appearance of [usually] with
the intent to deceive." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1976)). Applying this definition to a child pornography case, the
court found that the language "simulated sexual conduct" is "sufficiently
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clear to convey a warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practices." Id.; see United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
In the present case, the Statute's plain language and context gave
clear notice that Marshall prohibited visual depictions of a child engaged
in sexual conduct. See Appendix A. A state's compelling interest in protecting children is sufficient to apply a child pornography statute broadly
to include any use of children as subjects of pornographic material, even
if no actual sexual conduct occurs. See Jordan,665 P.2d at 1287. When
measured by common understanding and practices, Petitioner's computer program, which uses Dede's image taken from an actual photograph, and generates lifelike sexual animations of her, is recognizable as
child pornography.
Petitioner admits that he used Dede's image by scanning photographs he took of her modeling a bikini into the computer. (R. at 3.)
This scanning process uses actual photographs which are reduced to
computer binary codes and can be manipulated with image processing
programs. See generally PHILLIP ROBINSON & NANCY TAMOSAITIS, THE
JoY OF CYBERSEX 9 (1993). By writing specific codes, Petitioner developed a program capable of manipulating Dede's image, and simulating
sexual performances in which Dede appears by supplying the missing
details and necessary animation for these acts. (R. at 3, 6.) Because creation of this program constitutes creation of child pornography, this
Court should affirm the judgment of the courts below.
C.

PETITIONER DISSEMINATED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

To A

CHILD IN

VIOLATION OF THE MARSHALL STATUTE.

Computers are now among the most common technologies in
America. George Gilder, LIFE AFTER TELEVISION: THE COMING TRANSFORMATION OF MEDIA AND AMERICAN LIFE 175 (rev. ed. 1994). The census
bureau reports that by October 1989, of children between ages 3 and 17,
46 percent used a computer either at home or at school. Id. One commentator has noted that the problem of access by minors to online pornography is growing. See Charles D. Baker, Offenses Against Minors:
Prohibitthe ElectronicFurnishingof Obscene Material to Minors, 10 GA.
ST. U.L. REV. 104, 112 (1993) (citing ComputerPorn Problem Grows Digitally in the U.S., TORONTO STAR, Mar. 15, 1993, at C5).
To protect youth from child pornography in this age of technology,
Marshall incorporated into the Statute a stringent control on communicative material available to minors when that material involves sexual
depictions of children. See Appendix A. The Statute prohibits knowing
or reckless dissemination of child pornography to a minor. Id. By failing
to impose sufficient procedures to impede access, Petitioner recklessly
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disseminated child pornography to children. (R. at 3, 4-5.) For these
reasons, this Court should affirm the lower court's holding that Petitioner is liable for dissemination.
1.

AS A SYSTEMS OPERATOR ON A COMPUTER BILLBOARD, PETITIONER
DISSEMINATED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY TO CHILDREN.

The Statute assigns liability for dissemination of child pornography
to a minor when a person recklessly or knowingly distributes child pornography, or causes it to be supplied or distributed. See Appendix A.
Petitioner maintains he did not disseminate child pornography to minors
under the statute because, as the computer bulletin board system (BBS)
operator, he merely included a program on a computer bulletin board
onto which a user must actively enter to access a particular program. (R.
at 7.)
A systems operator ("sysop") does not, however, play a passive role
in the computer industry. While the end user temporarily controls the
computer program through system commands, this "control" is strictly
limited to the program that is made available by the sysop. Dennis Fiery,
Secrets of a Super Hacker 105 (1994). One court discussed the sysop's
responsibility as the disseminator of material placed on the BBS for access by users. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret
Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993). The court recognized that a
sysop had the ability to review anything on the system, and, more importantly, the ability to delete any documents or information from the BBS.
Id. at 435-36. The court also found that material available on a BBS is
disseminated when a caller logs into the bulletin board, and receives the
available information. Id. at 442.
As a sysop, Petitioner made Kid Stuff available to users of his BBS.
(R. at 3-4.) Petitioner personally handled all subscriptions and was responsible for issuing PINs for access to the programs. (R. at 3-4.) Were
it not for Petitioner's actions, the pornographic images of Dede Domingo
would never have been released. As such, Petitioner became liable for
the dissemination of child pornography to Dede Domingo when she
logged onto the program Kid Stuff. For this reason, this Court should
affirm the courts below.
2.

PETITIONER RECKLESSLY ALLOWED MINORS ACCESS TO HIS
PORNOGRAPHIC PROGRAM.

The Statute states that a person is "reckless," and thus liable under
the Statute, when he "fails to take adequate means to prevent the dissemination" of pornographic materials to minors. See Appendix A.
"Reckless" may also mean an awareness and conscious disregard of a
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substantial risk that the prohibited circumstances exist. Arizona v. Jannamon, 819 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Ariz. 1991).
Petitioner would have this Court believe that he may not be held
liable under the Statute because he required proof of age from subscribers to prevent children from accessing the program. (R. at 7.) The record
in this case and precedent from other courts, however, suggests
otherwise.
As a sysop on an interactive computer network, Petitioner was responsible for verifying that disseminations were made properly. See
Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 435, 442. In addition, as a computer insider, he was aware that improper use of passwords and access
without passwords are common. See FIERY, SECRETS OF SUPER HACKER
40 (1994).
Petitioner assigned passwords to users based on answers to an onscreen questionnaire and a photocopy of age identification sent to him by
mail or facsimile. (R. at 3.) He made no attempt to verify or corroborate
the information supplied by would-be users. Id. He merely assumed the
information was true. See id. Without more, Petitioner's method of assuring the majority of potential users sinks to the level of recklessness,
because the only methods he employed were inherently unreliable. This
fact is demonstrated by the record; John Sawyer, all of 16 years old,
skirted Petitioner's inadequate "safeguards" by the simplest, unsophisticated means.
Further, even if the age information sent to Petitioner was correct,
he had no method to ensure that the approved user was the only one to
access the program. Id. In this case, Petitioner received false information from John Sawyer, and failed to even attempt to verify it. Id. Later,
Dede Domingo easily accessed the program by using a borrowed PIN. Id.
Had Petitioner implemented adequate measures of security, neither
child would have been able to do so. Because Petitioner failed to take
adequate means to prevent his pornography from being accessed by minors, this Court should affirm the trial court's determination that Petitioner is liable for reckless dissemination under the Statute.
CONCLUSION
The influx of technological advancements into the business of producing and distributing sexually explicit material requires the application of regulatory policies to address these innovations. Sexually explicit
material has taken the form of television programming, telephone
messages, and computer-generated messages. Like the traditional forms
of sexually explicit material-books, magazines and films-these new
forms pose a significant threat to children.
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This Court should continue the judicial and legislative trend of protecting children from child pornography by holding Petitioner accountable under the Statute. For these reasons, Respondents request that this
Court affirm the judgments of the courts below.
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APPENDIX A
MARsHALL REVISED STATUTES

OBSCENITY, PORNOGRAPHY, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

CHAPTER 45

§ III. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY:
A. Child Pornography Defined
1. Any material or performance constitutes child pornography if:
(a) the work appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) the work depicts or describes fornication, sadomasochistic sexual
acts, masturbation; excretory functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals,
whether normal or perverted, actual or simulated and involves a person
under the age of eighteen engaged in such acts; and
(c) the work, lacks serious literary, artistic, pclitical or scientific
value.
2. Any person who creates or disseminates child pornography will
be liable for not less than $50,000.00 for each individual offense.
B. A person creates Child Pornography when he or she videotapes,
films, photographs, or otherwise uses, depicts, displays or portrays by
means of any visual medium or reproduction, stage play or live performance, any child whom he or she knows or reasonably should know to be
under the age of eighteen, actually or by simulation engaged in any act
or conduct defined in I A herein, alone or with other children or adults.
$ C. A person disseminates child pornography to a minor when he or she
recklessly or knowingly supplies, distributes, displays or exhibits, or by
his or her recklessness causes to be supplied, distributed or displayed or
exhibited, to anyone under the age of eighteen years, any material or
performance described in A herein. For purposes of this section, a person is reckless who fails to take adequate means to prevent the dissemination of pornographic materials described herein to anyone under
eighteen years of age.
D. Civil Action by Parent or Guardian:
(1) A parent or legal guardian of a minor child used in the creation
of child pornography as defined herein may bring a cause of action for
damages on behalf of said child in an amount not less than $50,000.00
for each individual violation of paragraph B of this section.
(2) A parent or legal guardian of a minor child to whom child pornography has been disseminated as defined herein may bring a cause of
action for damages on behalf of such minor child in an amount not less
than $50,000.00 for each individual violation of paragraph C of this
section.

